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INTRODUCTION

"For the past century, the most persistent and perplexing issue
arising under the Eleventh Amendment has been presented in suits
brought against state officers and contested on the ground that such
proceedings violated the state's sovereign immunity."' The Supreme
Court, in its contemporary struggle with federalism and the Eleventh
Amendment,2 surprisingly addressed the appropriateness of suits
8
against state officials in its recent decision, Seminole Tribe v. Florida
Following the Seminole decision's primary discussion of congressional abrogation, 4 the Court introduced a simple yet troubling limitation on the Ex parte Young doctrine. 6 Some commentators think the
Young issue is of little concern, 7 but a closer analysis of the issue
reveals the difficulties that the Seminole and Idaho v. Coeurd'Alene Tribes
1

CLYDE E.JACOBS, THE ELEvENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 110 (1972).
2 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTnTUTONAL LAW § 3-25, at 173 (2d ed. 1988)
("The eleventh amendment lies at the center of the tension between state sovereign immunity and the desire to have in place mechanisms for the effective vindication of federal
rights.").
3 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The Seminole Court rendered two holdings that affect Eleventh
Amendmentjurisdiction. First, the Court limited Congress's ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity. I at 72-73. Second, Seminole narrowed the ability of individuals to sue
state officials. Id. at 76. This Note will focus on the latter holding. For a detailed discussion of Seminole's congressional abrogation ruling, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and ConstitutionalFederalism:The Supreme Court'sLopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213 (1996) and Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARv.L. REV. 102 (1996).
4 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 55-73; see also supra note 3 (discussing Seminole's limitations on
Eleventh Amendment jurisdiction).
5 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
6 Id. at 155-56 (granting federal court jurisdiction over a suit, in spite of the Eleventh
Amendment, in which an individual sought injunctive relief against a state official). Seminole frustrates an individual's ability to gain access to a federal court "where Congress has
prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily
created right, [because] a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and
permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young." Seminole, 517 U.S.
at 74.
7 See David P. Currie, Ex parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547,
551 (1997) ("Seminole Tribe is no threat to Ex parte Young as a crucial remedy for the protection of constitutional rights."); Monaghan, supra note 3, at 128 ("Seminole Tribe will have no
significant impact on the actual authority of federal courts to enforce . .. federal laws
prospectively against states in suits by private persons.").
8 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
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decisions could create in a number of areas, including environmental
2
law,9 bankruptcy, 10 antitrust," and civil rights.'
The Eleventh Amendment emerged in 1798 to assure the proper
respect for state sovereign immunity under the United States Constitution.' 3 The courts' interpretation of this Amendment has effectively
and consistently ensured immunity when suits are against the states
themselves;,however, the federal judiciary continues to alter the applicability of sovereign immunity when individuals bring suits against state
14
officials.
9 See, e.g., Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose
Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?,20 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 199, 28894 (1996) (arguing that Congress did not intend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") to be an exclusive source of remedies, and that courts should supplement the remedies available under CERCLA); Courtney
E. Flora, Chapter, An Inapt Fiction: The Use of the Ex parte Young Doctrinefor Environmental
Citizen Suits Against States After Seminole Tribe, 27 ENVrL. L. 935, 948-49 (1997) (recognizing that after Seminole "Congress no longer has power to abrogate sovereign immunity
under the Commerce Clause, [consequently,] Exparte Youngis the sole means of recourse
for citizens against states that violate federal environmental laws").
10 See S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter, 70 Am.
BANrtx LJ. 195, 213-15 (1996);Joseph F. Riga, State Immunity in Bankruptcy After Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 29, 51, 67 (1997) (maintaining that Seminole
.sounded the death knell for section 106(a)" of the Bankruptcy Code, and questioning
"[w]hether Young-type suits in bankruptcy will survive the case-by-case balancing test of
CoeurdAlend').
11 See, e.g., Susan Beth Farmer, BalancingState Sovereignty and Competition: An Analysis of
the Impact of Seminole Tribe on the Antitrust State Action Immunity Doctrine, 42 ViLL. L. REv.
111, 182-88 (1997); Michael J. Kaufman, Mending the Weathered JurisdictionalFences in the
Supreme Court's Securities FraudDecisions, 49 SMU L. REV. 159, 196 (1996) (referencing the
remedies available under federal antitrust laws).
12

See PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FED-

185 (3d ed. Supp. 1997) ("Virtually the entire class of modern civil
rights litigation might be barred by an expansive reading of the immunity of states from
suit in federal court."); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and
Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 59 (1998) ("Exparte Young routinely allows civil rights plaintiffs to evade the Eleventh Amendment.... ."). But see Flora, supra note 9, at 960 (arguing
that today "[c]ivil rights legislation is relatively secure due to the Court's continued allowance of congressional abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment").
13
SeeJAcoBs, supra note 1, at 64-74. The Supreme Court has adopted this historical
perspective of the Eleventh Amendment. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54
(1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1890). Some commentators, however, have
found "little historical support . .. for the Court's controversial assertion ... that the
Eleventh Amendment restored a broad principle of state sovereign immunity" understood
to have been implicit in the Constitution. James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An
"Explanatory"Accountof the Eleventh Amendment 83 CORNEL. L. REv. 1269, 1369-70 (1998).
Professor Pfander argues that the Eleventh Amendment was merely an "explanatory
amendment" of Article III, id. at 132--52, and that it "has virtually no modem role to play
in defining the power of the federal courts to hear claims against the states as parties
defendant." Id. at 1362 n.415.
14 When a litigant names a state as a party to a suit, the Eleventh Amendment will
generally preclude the action with respect to the state. See infra Part IA.A. However, the
court must conduct a different inquiry when a state official, as opposed to the State itself, is
the party named in a suit. See infra Part I.A.2.
ERAL-STATE RELATIONS
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The doctrine of Ex parte Young embodies the judicially created
approach for determining whether sovereign immunity extends to
suits nominally against state officials. 15 The viability of the Ex parte
Young approach remained settled 16 until the Seminole decision added a
new inquiry that narrowed the doctrine's application. 17 Congress and
the federal judiciary have had almost ninety years to reflect on the
Court's decision in Ex parte Young. During that time, the law has never
contemplated the existence of a statutory remedy as an indication that
Ex parte Young does not apply. Moreover, Coeur d'Alends intimation of
a new approach in Ex parte Young cases further limits the effectiveness
of the doctrine's protection of federal rights.
Part I of this Note details the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity, focusing on the Young exception that is applicable when the defendant is a state official.' 8 This Part also explores the
judicially created cause of action available in suits against federal officials that Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics19 and its progeny provide. Part 11 discusses the Supreme Court's
decisions in Seminole and Coeur d'Alene. Part Ill argues that the federalist policies underlying the Eleventh Amendment and Young, as well as
the precedent and rationale on which the Court relies in its recent
decisions, do not support a new approach for finding otherwise culpable state officials immune from suit under the guise of state sovereign
immunity. Additionally, this Part suggests several interpretations of
these decisions and discusses their potential to save the Ex parte Young
doctrine from further retrenchment. This Note concludes that the
Court should neither expand state sovereign immunity further by infringing on individual rights, nor should it add any additional limitations to the Ex parte Young doctrine.

15 Individuals may gain federal jurisdiction in a suit against a state official under
Young when the suit seeks prospective relief. See infra Part 1A.2.
16 The Ex parte Young doctrine has not survived without alteration. Since the Court
handed down its decision in 1908, it has established several limitations on suits in federal
court against state officers. Limiting Young the Court held that federal courts may not
grant retroactive relief. Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974); infranotes 68-85 and
accompanying text. Additionally, a federal court may not enjoin state officers from violating state law. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 124-25 (1984).
Each of these limitations is necessary to ensure that the Ex parte Young doctrine's sole purpose is to protect the supremacy of federal law. See infra Part Ill.A

17
18

19

See supra note 6.
ExpareYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
403 U.S. 388 (1971); see infra Part I.B.
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I
BACKGROUND

A.

Suits Against State Officials
1.

The Eleventh Amendment Prevents Suits Against States

The Eleventh Amendment provides, "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." 20
History suggests that Congress fashioned the Eleventh Amend21
ment in response to a desire to preserve state sovereign immunity.
Prior to the Eleventh Amendment's enactment, courts followed a literal interpretation of Article III of the United States Constitution,
which provides federal courts with the authority to adjudicate
22
"[c] ontroversies... between a State and Citizens of another State."
Justice Iredell in Chisholm v. Georgia,23 relying on the explicit language
of Article III, expressed the federal judiciary's rejection of state sovereign immunity. The Iredell majority held that a federal court's jurisdiction over a suit filed against a state existed regardless of a state's
consent to suit. 24

Subsequently, the states ratified the Eleventh

25
Amendment to overturn Chisholm.
The meaning and history of the Eleventh Amendment, however,
are the subject of much debate. 26 Today, there are two general apU.S. CONST. amend. XI.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text. More specifically, the Eleventh Amendment sought to prevent "private actions compelling states to pay their war debts."
Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 2240; seeJoseph J. Weissman, Note, Upping the Ante: Allowing
Indian Tribes to Sue States in Federal Court Under the Indian Gaming Regulatoy Ac 62 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 123, 142-43 (1993).
22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; seeJohnJ. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1899 (1983) (suggesting that
evidence supporting state sovereign immunity at the time of the Constitution's ratification
20
21

was weak, but that "compelling evidence suggests that article III was understood... to
mean exactly what it says").
23 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.).
24

Id. at 431.

25 The Chisholm decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
313, 325 (1934); see also Weissman, supra note 21, at 143 ("The decision in
Chisholm alarmed the states."). But see Gibbons, supra note 22, at 1926-27 (arguing that
"Congress's initial reaction to the Chisholm decision hardly demonstrates the sort of outrage so central to the profound shock thesis," and concluding that "Congress did not regard Chisholm... as a matter of great moment").
26 See Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U.
CHI. L. REv. 61, 61 (1989); see also Weissman, supra note 21, at 143 ("Although the Eleventh
Amendment was intended to 'reverse' Chisholm, it does not necessarily follow that the
Framers of the Eleventh Amendment meant to create a blanket of state sovereignty." (footnote omitted)).
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proaches to the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. First, the
courts have adopted a conventional view2 7 that does not interpret literally all aspects of the Eleventh Amendment. 28 The clear language
of the Amendment prohibits suits that citizens of another state or for29
eign citizens have brought against a state.
In practice, courts have embraced a much more expansive inter° extended a state's Elevpretation. The Court in Hans v. LouisianaP
enth Amendment protection to bar suits that one of its own citizens
can bring.3 ' The issue before the Hans Court was whether a citizen of
32
Louisiana could sue the state of Louisiana on a federal question.
Hans "expanded the scope of the [Eleventh] Amendment to include
federal question cases" that a state's own citizens can bring.33 The
Court viewed this extension beyond the Amendment's explicit lan27 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fightingthe Words of the Eleventh Amendmen4 102 HARv. L.
Rzv. 1342, 1342 (1989); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment:
A CriticalEvaluation, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1372, 1372-80 (1989); Massey, supra note 26, at 6164, 67-72.
28
See TRiBE, supranote 2, § 3-25, at 175 (explaining that cases contemplating Eleventh
Amendment issues have "focused not on the language of the eleventh amendment, but on
the concept of sovereign immunity of which it is a reminder and 'exemplification'" (footnote omitted)); see also Massey, supra note 26, at 62 (explaining "that the [eleventh]
amendment made constitutional an original understanding that the states were immune
from private suits in the federal courts").
29
See supra text accompanying note 20.
30 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (A Louisiana citizen brought suit against the state of Louisiana to
recover unpaid interest from state-issued bonds.).
31 Id. at 14-15, 20 (finding the state immune from suit under the principle of sovereign immunity).
32 Hans brought suit under the Contracts Clause, art. I, § 10, of the U.S. Constitution.
See id. at 3.
33 Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 2242. The Hans Court stated that it was "clearly established" that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal question suits that noncitizens bring
against a state, see Monaghan, supra note 3, at 105 & n.25, and observed that it would be
"anomalous" to protect a state from suits its own citizens bring while failing to protect that
state from suits that citizens of other states bring. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. In so noting, the
Court recognized that its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment went beyond the language of the Amendment and instead adopted notions of state sovereign immunity inherent in Article II. See Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the
PotentialEvisceration ofEx Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 495, 497 & nn.16-17 (1997). The
Hans decision interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to bar a suit against a state regardless
of whether the plaintiff brought suit under diversity or federal question jurisdiction. See
Low &JE srES, supranote 12, at 184 (observing that the Hans Court "seemed to read the
amendment as evidencing a comprehensive policy of state sovereign immunity in the federal courts"); infranotes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing the conventional view of
the Eleventh Amendment).
Under a more narrow reading of Hans, courts view the Eleventh Amendment as only
barring diversity suits. See Low &JErFMEs, supra note 12, at 191. This interpretation means
that the Eleventh Amendment would permit suits involving federal issues, see id.at 192, but
would not permit suits against a state on state issues, because Article III does not reach
state law questions. SeeJackson, supra, at 500-01 & nn.29-30; infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing the revisionist view of the Eleventh Amendment).
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guage as necessary to uphold the sovereign immunity protections that
34
favor the states.
The Hansinterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is the foundation of the conventional view.3 5 This interpretation bars federal
courts from all suits against states irrespective of the citizenship of the
claimant or the nature of the claim-state or federal law-on which
federal jurisdiction rests. 36 The only exception to this rule, according
to the Hans Court, occurs when a state, sued by name in federal court,
consents to suit.3 7 Thus, the emphasis of the conventional view is that

the Eleventh Amendment "embodies an overarching principle of state
sovereign immunity from federal court jurisdiction."38
However, many scholars endorse a revisionist view that directly
conflicts with the conventional view that the majority of today's
Supreme Court holds. 3 9 The revisionists believe that the proper interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is a literal one, which would
allow suits to proceed, regardless of citizenship, whenever jurisdiction
rests on the existence of a federal question. 40 Commentators have
34
Hans, 134 U.S. at 14-15. The Hans Court confirmed the Eleventh Amendment's
bar of suits that noncitizens of a state bring, id. at 10, and then reasoned:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was
understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in
the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of
foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by its own
citizens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States:
can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face.
Id. at 15; see also Laura M. Herpers, Note, State Sovereign Immunity: Myth or Reality After Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 1005, 1021 (1997) (noting that in
Hans, "the Court held that the spirit, not the letter, of the Amendment preserved state
sovereign immunity in all suits brought by citizens against states").
35
See Massey, supranote 26, at 62 ("The conventional doctrine has its modem origin
in Hans....").
See id. at 63 ("The conventional view ... operates to foreclose private claims in
36
federal court against a state by its own citizens that arise under federal statutory or constitutional law.").
37 See id. at 67.
38 Id.
39 See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1473-84
(1987); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines (pts.
1 & 2), 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 1203 (1977-1978); William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction
Rather than a ProhibitionAgainstJurisdiction,35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1033-34 (1983); Gibbons,
supra note 22, at 1890-94; Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 2238-47; Vicki C. Jackson, The
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 3-4
(1988); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98
HARV.L. REv. 61, 67-71 (1984).
See H. Stephen Harris,Jr. & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh AmendmentJurisprudenceAfter
40
Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes of Action over Which
the Federal CourtsHave ExclusiveJurisdiction,37 EMORY L.J. 645, 654-56 (1988).
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taken this literal interpretation to mean that the initial intent behind
the Eleventh Amendment was to prohibit only diversity suits, and not
to reach federal question suits.4 1 These academic revisionists believe

that the Supreme Court should overturn the Hans decision. 42 The
revisionists seek to preserve the "basic structural principles of the original Constitution repudiated by the Court's [Eleventh Amendment]
43
doctrine."
The conventional view continues to govern; the Supreme Court
adheres to the Hans interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, barring a suit whenever "the state is the real, substantial party in interest."44 States possess certain attributes of sovereignty from their
unique position within the structure of the United States govern41

Proponents of the revisionist view maintain that:
The eleventh amendment's failure to mention in-state citizens suggests
that its drafters did not intend it to reach federal question suits ....

The most plausible interpretation of the eleventh amendment thus appears to be that it was designed simply and narrowly to overturn the result
the Supreme Court had reached in Chisholmv. Georgia Under this interpretation, the adopters of the amendment were following the traditions of
common law lawyers in solving only the problem in front of them by requiring a limiting construction of the state-citizen diversity clause.
Fletcher, supra note 39, at 1060-63 (footnote omitted); see also Gibbons, supranote 22, at
1934 (noting that the Federalists sought to "leave intact the clauses in article I,section 2
dealing with... federal question jurisdiction").
42 The revisionists argue that:
[T]he result[ ] in Hans... contradict[s] the unambiguous limitations of
the Eleventh Amendment's text-a contradiction that suggests the clear error of the Supreme Court's first interpretive premise that the Amendment
is in fact concerned with sovereign immunity. If coherence of general sovereign immunity doctrine is achieved only by mangling the Amendment's
text, the obvious lesson should be that the Amendment was not designed to
embody any such doctrine.
Amar, supranote 39, at 1476; see also Harris & Kenny, supra note 40, at 656 (explaining that
Hans "laid the foundation on which ... the Court's unfortunate eleventh amendment
jurisprudence has been built").
Those justices of the Supreme Court who advocate the minority view on the proper
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment believe that Hans is misinterpreted, but purport not to want to overrule it. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 84 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Several of these justices go even farther and maintain that the Court reached
the wrong decision in Hans. See id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting).
43 Amar, supra note 39, at 1483. See generally Harris & Kenny, supra note 40, at 700
("[T]he weight of scholarship demonstrates that the historical evidence offers no support
for the claim that the eleventh amendment constitutionalized any common law concept of
sovereign immunity.").
44 Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). The
Supreme Court subsequently elaborated:
The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if "the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration," or if the effect of the judgment would be
"to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act."
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (citation omitted).
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ment.45 Sovereign immunity is one such attribute, enabling a state to
function without the disruption of burdensome litigation or judicial
interference in policymaking and budgetary decisions. 46 When states
are susceptible to suit, their sovereignty is at risk. Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment confers upon a state the "privilege not to be
sued." 47
But courts also recognize three exceptions to the Eleventh
Amendment's prohibition against suing a state. First, a state may consent to suit.4 8 Second, legislation may express a congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 49 Finally, the Exparte Young doctrine
may permit suits against state officials that directly affect state policy
50
and resources.

45

Professor Amar explained:
[T]he ...Constitution preserved the independent lawmaking authority of
state governments. The language of the Tenth Amendment simply distilled
the underlying structural logic of the original Constitution: Wherever authorized by its own state constitution, a state government can enact any law
not inconsistent with the federal Constitution and constitutional federal
laws.
Amar,supranote 39, at 1466.
46
See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) ("The very object and purpose of the 11th
Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties."); see also Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should
PoliticalSubdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 577, 601
(1994) ("Next to a state's power to determine its own governmental structure and methods
of conducting its governmental business, a state's power to raise revenue to finance that
business is the prerogative protected by our dual system of government.").
47
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 n.5
(1993); see also Amar, supra note 39, at 1473 ("[State s] overeign immunity ousts all federal
jurisdiction, whether in law, equity, or admiralty; whether the suit is based on state law,
congressional statute, or the Constitution itself; and whether or not state liability would
most fully remedy a constitutional wrong perpetrated by the state itself.").
48
See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883). A state waives Eleventh Amendment protection and consents to suit only when it evidences, with "express language" or
such language that leaves no other reasonable interpretation, a desire to abdicate sovereign immunity. Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray, McSween &
Patten v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
49
See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) ("Congress must
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in
the statute itself."). After the Court's decision in Seminole to overrule Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (expanding Congress's ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity to include acts under the Commerce Clause), see Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996), the only remaining source of congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment is when Congress acts pursuant to its power under "the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976).
50
See Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 2246 ("[W]hen Hans gave an expansive reading to
the Eleventh Amendment in 1890, the ...Court felt compelled to create the exception of
Ex parte Young."); see also infra Part I.A.2 (discussing when the Ex parte Young doctrine may
permit suits against state officials).
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The Ex parte Young Doctrine: When Suits Against State
Officials Are Permitted Despite the Eleventh Amendment

The Court in Ex parte Young established the third exception to
state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.5 1 Sovereign immunity is unavailable to state officials who act unconstitutionally, even though the state may have authorized their actions. 52 This
limitation on the Eleventh Amendment is necessary to ensure the
53
supremacy of federal law.
Young began as a suit filed in response to several acts that the
Minnesota legislature passed which regulated the maximum rates that
railroads could charge for the transportation of passengers and commodities. 54 These acts set the maximum rates at levels below that
which the railroads had been previously charging. 55 The stockholders
of the various railroad companies operating in Minnesota brought an
action to enjoin the railroad companies from adopting the new rate
schedules and to enjoin both the Railroad and Warehouse Commission and the State Attorney General, Edward T. Young, from enforcing the acts. 56 The stockholders claimed that the reduction in rates
that the acts prescribed deprived them and their companies "of their
property without due process of law, and.., of the equal protection
of the laws" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 57 The circuit
court issued a temporary injunction to prevent the Attorney General
from levying penalties on the railroad companies for violations of the
51

Ex parte Young unified the law that the Court had applied in similar situations. See

7.5.1, at 390 & n.6 (1994) ("[Sleveral earlier
cases had held... that the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude suits against state officers."). In In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), the Court began laying the foundation for the
ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERALJURISDICrION §

exception that Young established. See CHARLES ALAN WIUGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

§ 48, at 307 (5th ed. 1994). The Ayers Court held that a suit against a state officer was not
barred when it was a suit against the officer as an individual. See id. at 307-08. However,
the Court also held that when only the individual acting through the state as its officer
could perform the action, the suit was against the state, and therefore barred. See id. at
308. Following Ayers, the law "was clouded" on the issue of whether injunctive relief was
available to restrain state officials. See id. at 308 & n.10 (citing Reagan v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466 (1898); Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co.,
200 U.S. 273 (1906); McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co., 202 U.S. 543 (1906)). Youngsettled the
obscure state of the law. See id. at 308.
52 See Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). In addition to the suits against
state officials permitted under Young, sovereign immunity is also unavailable to state officials sued in their individual capacities for damages. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
237-38 (1974).
53 See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993).
54 Ex parte Young 209 U.S. at 127-29.
55 See id. at 127.
56
57

See id at 129.
Id. at 130.
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acts. 58 The Attorney General, in turn, disobeyed this injunction,
claiming that the court's issuance of the injunction violated the Eleventh Amendment. 59
The primary issue before the Court was whether the action
against the Attorney General, asserting a deprivation of Fourteenth
Amendment rights, was actually against the State, and thus in violation
of the Eleventh Amendment. 60 To resolve this issue, the Court considered the relationship between the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments. State action raises legal issues under both amendments.6 1 However, when a suit is brought against a state, courts must
62
Speseparately consider its validity under each of the amendments.
cifically, for a valid suit under the Fourteenth Amendment there must
be state action; however, if the state itself is performing the state action, then the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the defendantstate.
The doctrine of Ex parte Young, however, relies on a legal fiction
when suits are brought against state officials to overcome this paradox. 63 This legal fiction allows a court to recognize an official's unconstitutional conduct as state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, while simultaneously concluding that the action is "not
attributable to the State for purposes of the Eleventh [AmendSee id at 132.
See i&/at 134.
60
See i&. at 149.
61 The Eleventh Amendment exists to prevent suits against a state. See supra text accompanying note 20. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoN sT. amend. XIV, § 1. This Amendment is specifically tailored to the States, and
therefore "it can be violated only by conduct that may be fairly characterized as 'state
action.'" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982).
62 See supra note 61.
63 In suits against state officials who claim Eleventh Amendment protection because
they allegedly acted under state authority, Young defeats their defense by employing a legal
fiction:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the
use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury
of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which
does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is
simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use
of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void
because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks
to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority
of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity
from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
58

59
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ment]."64 By adopting this legal fiction, the Young Court held that the
suit against the Attorney General was not against the State. 65
Following Young, courts readily endorsed the legal fiction, and
recognized an exception to the Eleventh Amendment whenever a suit
challenged the constitutionality of a state official's action. 6 6 The federal judiciary has accepted the Ex parte Young doctrine as a necessary
device to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and to
hold state officials responsible to the supreme authority of the United
States. 67
In Edelman v. Jordan,68 the Court established an important limitation on the Ex parte Young doctrine: sovereign immunity will protect
state officials sued in their official capacity if the relief sought is retroactive. 69 In Edelman, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief against various state public-aid program officials for administrating their
programs in violation of federal regulations. 70 The district court, relying on Young, issued an injunction that required the officials to adhere to the federal regulations and, more importantly, to compensate
the beneficiaries of the program for past benefits that had wrongfully
been withheld. 71 The court of appeals affirmed the decision, but the
Supreme Court reversed, disallowing the retroactive payment of
funds. 72 The Edelman Court limited Young's application by allowing
only prospective, injunctive relief in suits against state officials, on the
ground that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a court from hearing
a claim for retroactive relief.73
Edelman's limitation requires a court to focus on the nature of the
relief sought in determining whether Young allows the court to grant
the requested relief.74 If the relief is prospective in nature, then the
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982).
Ex parte Young 209 U.S. at 159-60.
66
See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 103 (1984) (stating that a suit against a state official "would not be one against the State since the federallaw allegation would strip the state officer of his official authority").
67
See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993) (holding that Young carved out "a necessary exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity"); Pennhurs4465 U.S. at 146 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the doctrine of
Ex parte Young"has deep roots in the history of sovereign immunity and makes Young reconcilable with the principles of sovereign immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment").
68
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Id. at 664-78.
69
70
Id. at 653.
71
See id. at 656.
72 Id. at 658-59.
73 Id. at 664-78.
74 See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1979) (asking whether the relief sought
"constitute[s] permissible prospective relief or a 'retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury'?").
64
65
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Eleventh Amendment will not bar the plaintiff's claim. 75 However, if
the relief is "analogous to a retroactive award that requires 'the payment of funds from the state treasury,"' then the court must dismiss
the claim.7 6 Such "retroactive" relief is not allowed because of the
"real... party in interest" determination that the Eleventh Amendment incorporates. 77 This determination provides that if a remedy
comes from the state treasury, then the state, as opposed to the state
official, is the real party in interest. 78 The Eleventh Amendment bars
suits where the state is the real party in interest. 79 However, an
Edelman analysis entails more than questioning the effect on the state
treasury, because even prospective relief may have an "ancillary effect"
on funds within the state treasury.80 So long as the ancillary effect
results from relief that is prospective in nature, the federal court will
retain jurisdiction over the suit. 8 1 Therefore, the ultimate determina82
tion under Edelman is whether the relief is prospective or retroactive.
Prior to the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, Edelman
was the only major limitation on the Ex parte Young doctrine's protection of federal rights.8 3 The Edelman limitation was consistent with
Young, 4 and the Court has noted that it struck the proper balance
between "the supremacy of federal law... [and] the constitutional
75
tive. . .

See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664 ("[T] he relief awarded in Ex parte Young was prospec).

76 Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 690 (1982).
77 Ford Motor Co.v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) ("[W]hen the
action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real,

substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even
though individual officials are nominal defendants."). See supranotes 44-47 and accompanying text.
78
See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
79 See supranotes 44-47 and accompanying text.
80 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668 ("[A]n ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible
and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young.... .");
see, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (allowing a monetary damage award because
the money would be used to provide future benefits, not to compensate for past violations
of federal law); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978) (treating a court order requiring
funds to be paid out of the state treasury as ancillary relief).
81 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668.
82
See Quern, 440 U.S. at 337 ("The distinction between that relief permissible under
the doctrine of ExparteYoungand that found barred in Edelmanwas the difference between
prospective relief on one hand and retrospective relief on the other."); Edelman, 415 U.S.
at 677 (holding that "afederal court's remedial power.., is necessarily limited to prospective... relief, and may not include a retroactive award" (citation omitted)). However, the
Edelman distinction will not arise if the suit against the state official "is in fact... against a
State ...regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief." Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984).
83 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 169-70 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 16.
84 The Court in Young awarded only prospective relief. ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123,
159-60 (1908).
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immunity of the States. 8 5 Despite the settled state of the Ex parte
Young doctrine, the Seminole Court created a new limitation on the
doctrine's application. 6 To fashion this new limitation, the Seminole
decision relied on the Court's reasoning in Schweiker v. Chilicky8 7 and
its progenitors, which provides for a Bivens cause of action.88
B.

The Bivens Cause of Action

The Supreme Court established a new cause of action in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics8 9 to remedy federal officials' unconstitutional acts. This cause of action originated
because of the disparate remedial posture in which state and federal
officials stood when they committed the same unconstitutional act.9 0
Consider, for example, a search and seizure that officials from both
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and state police conducted that violated a person's Fourth Amendment rights. Although
the state police officers were subject to liability for their unconstitutional acts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 9 1 the FBI agents, prior to Bivens,
escaped liability because no federal cause of action applied. 92 The
Bivens Court sought to rectify this inequity by providing persons injured by federal officials with the "right to seek damages for the in'93
fringement of [their] constitutional rights.
In Bivens, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics arrested Bivens and searched his home. 94 Bivens sued the federal agents, alleging
that "the arrest was 'done unlawfully, unreasonably and contrary to
law."' 95 Both the district court and court of appeals dismissed Bivens's
85

Pennhurs 465 U.S. at 105.
See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
87 487 U.S. 412 (1988); see infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
88 See infra Part I.B.
89 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
90 Cf Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978) ("[T]here is no basis for according
to federal officials a higher degree of immunity from liability... than is accorded state
officials when sued for the identical violation .... ").
91 Section 1983 provides a cause of action when someone acting under the color of
state law deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities that the Constitution and
federal laws provide. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). In this example, the state police officers, as
their title indicates, perform the search and seizure under the authority that state law
grants them. Thus, the aggrieved individual may sue the state police officers under § 1983.
92 Federal officials are not subject to § 1983 because their authority does not arise
under state law. See Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens ConstitutionalTort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67
N.C. L. REv. 337, 337 (1989). But see CHEMERMNSKY, supranote 51, § 9.1, at 523 n.1 (reporting that "[f] ederal officials may be sued under § 1983 only if they act in concert with state
or local officers to violate the Constitution or laws of the United States." (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967))).
93 Rosen, supra note 92, at 337.
94 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
95 I- & n.1.
86
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suit for failing to state a federal cause of action, but the Supreme
97
Court reversed, 9 6 thereby creating a cause of action for damages.
The Bivens Court established a new cause of action against federal
officials that provides a remedy of monetary damages. 98 The Court
held that the petitioner was entitled to monetary damages for the unconstitutional acts of the federal agents: "' [I] t is... well settled that
where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides
for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done."' 99 Even though federal courts can award any relief in Bivens actions, courts consider monetary damages the proper remedy. 0 0
In addition to the need to compensate victims, some commentators believe that the monetary awards in Bivens actions also have the
advantage of deterring federal officials from violating federal law.' 0 '
The injured party may recover damages from the actual agents in
their personal capacity, but not from the federal government. 10 2 The
federal government stands behind the shield of sovereign immunity,
so plaintiffs bringing Bivens actions will be severely limited in the dam03
ages they can collect.'
Bivens actions pose collection problems for successful plaintiffs;
however, many potential Bivens plaintiffs face limitations that prevent
them from ever bringing suit. For example, Bivens actions are not
Id. at 390.
97 See id. at 397.
98 Bivens sought monetary damages for the federal agent's alleged violation of his
Fourth Amendment liberty interests. See id. at 390. Although the Fourth Amendment does
not specifically provide monetary damages for violations of its provisions, courts can fashion any relief necessary to remedy unconstitutional behavior. See id. at 395-97.
99 Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
100 See id. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring).
[S]ome form of damages is the only possible remedy for someone in Bivens' alleged position. It will be a rare case indeed in which an individual in
Bivens' position will be able to obviate the harm by securing injunctive re96

lief from any court ....

For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or

nothing.
IdM(Harlan, J., concurring).
101 See W. Mark Smith, "Damagesor Nothing"--The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64
CORNELL L. REv. 667, 668 n.8 (1979).
102 See Rosen, supranote 92, at 341 ("Courts... look to the Park Service policeman,
the INS official, or the FBI agent to be financially responsible for the actions each took on
behalf of the federal government.").
103
If plaintiffs can access only the agent'smoney, then there is little chance of a substantial recovery. However, if the federal government were liable, there would be no limit on
monetary recoveries. See Nestor M. Davidson, Note, ConstitutionalMass Torts: Sovereign Immunity and the Human RadiationExperiments, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1203, 1225 (1996) ("[A]ny
remedy against the United States would... create an incentive to reach the deep pockets
of the federal government. Federal officials would then essentially have nothing to fear in
terms of personal liability. The deterrent effects of Bivens would thus be undermined."
(footnote omitted)).
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available in two situations: when Congress has provided alternative
10 4
remedies, and when "special factors counselling hesitation" exist.
In the first case, courts will refuse to create a Bivens remedy for constitutional violations if Congress has created "comprehensive procedural
and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the
United States" for those particular violations. 10 5 This restriction applies whenever Congress has provided a comparable alternative
10 6
remedy.
The second limitation, on which the Seminole Court relied, 10 7 requires that courts pay "heed .

.

. to any special factors counselling

08
hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation."
Courts have not clearly identified what constitutes these "special factors."' 0 9 Instead, courts have applied the limitation by considering
whether Congress or the federal judiciary is the proper source for establishing the relief available to injured plaintiffs." 0
The Supreme Court made significant strides toward resolving the
ambiguity of the special factors limitation in Schweiker v. Chilicy.111 In
Schweiker, three individuals brought suit against federal officials in the
Social Security Administration, claiming a violation of procedural due
process. 112 They alleged that the Social Security Administration had
instituted a continuing disability review program that resulted in the
wrongful termination of their disability benefits. 11 The plaintiffs attempted to frame their case as a Bivens action seeking consequential
damages and damages for emotional distress." 4 The Schweiker Court
thus confronted the issue of whether plaintiffs could assert a cause of
5
action for money damages against the federal officials."
The Court found that Bivens remedies are not available "[w]hen
the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitu-

104

Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1983); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19

(1980).
Bush, 462 U.S. at 368.
See Rosen, supra note 92, at 358. The Court has continually emphasized that for
this exception to apply, the alternative remedy must be as effective as a Bivens remedy.
Bush, 462 U.S. at 388; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21-22.
107 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996).
108 Bush, 462 U.S. at 378.
109 See Rosen, supranote 92, at 359.
110 See, e.g., Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-90 (finding a special factor because of Congress's
superior position in evaluating the policy questions involved in the area of civil service).
111 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
112
Id. at 417-19.
113 See id.
114 See id- at 419-20.
115 See Sonya Gidumal, McCarthy v. Madigan: Exhaustion of Administrative Agency Remedies and Bivens, 7 ADmIN. LJ. AM. U. 373, 398 (1993).
105

106
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tional violations that may occur in the course of its administration."11 6
This finding indicates that Congress's authority in a particular area
may be enough to create a special factor regardless of whether Congress has actually created a statutory remedy." 7 In Schweiker, the
Court found that Congress was better able to determine whether a
new or additional remedy should be available under the Social Security Act. 118 The special factors counselling hesitation inquiry now focuses on the idea that "if the matter is in Congress' [s] domain, a
Bivens remedy will not be available." 1 9 This holding broadens the application of the special factors restriction, thereby further limiting the
20
availability of Bivens actions.'
II
RECENT CASES AFFECTING THE

Ex PARYE YOUNG DoCTmRNE

Two recent Supreme Court decisions altered the Ex parte Young
doctrine. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,the Court adopted its earlier interpretation in Schweiker of special factors counselling hesitation, and
relying on the reasoning behind the creation of the Bivens cause of
action, established a new limitation on the doctrine of Ex parte
Young.' 2 ' Although the Seminole Court addressed this issue only cursorily, the Court expanded this limitation and elaborated on a possible
new approach to the Ex parte Young doctrine in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
2
Tribe.12
116
Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423. The two exceptions to Bivens suits are not as distinct as
they once were. These two exceptions "have been blurred as the Court has found the
existence of congressionally created remedies to be a special factor counselling hesitation
and preventing the availability of Bivens suits." CHEMERiNSIW, supra note 51, § 9.1.3, at 458.
117 See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 423 ("[T]he concept of 'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress' has proved to include an appropriate
judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent."
(quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396 (1971))).
118
Id. at 426-27. Congress enacted legislation following the disastrous implementation
of the continuing disability review program to help rectify the problems with the administration of social security benefits. See id. at 415-17. This legislation, however, did not include any provisions that would have granted plaintiffs the sought-after monetary relief.
See id. at 424-25. Congress's authority over these matters and failure to supply the remedy
that the plaintiffs requested prevented the Court from creating a remedy to supplement
the legislation. See id. at 425-29.
119 Rosen, supra note 92, at 361; see Davidson, supra note 103, at 1212 (noting that the
Court is "increasingly emphasizing deference to legislative and executive prerogatives.").
120
See Rosen, supra note 92, at 359 ("[Tlhe special factors defense is broadening,
thereby further restricting the right of the victim of a constitutional deprivation to obtain
relief.").
121
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-76 (1996).
122
See infra Part II.B.
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Seminole Tribe v. Florida

Regulation of Indian gaming raises the perennial issue of federalism that pervades many aspects of Indian affairs. 12 3 Generally, federal
authority over Indian affairs stems from the Indian Commerce
Clause. 12 4 However, states may participate in the management of In-

dian affairs in two circumstances. First, Congress may explicitly authorize states to extend their jurisdiction over tribal land. 1 5 Second,
state law will apply implicitly when no superseding federal law
12 6
exists.
The Supreme Court, in Californiav. Cabazon Band of Mission Indi12 7
ans, held that states did not have the authority to regulate gaming
on tribal reservations. 12 8 After the Cabazon decision, neither applicable state laws nor clear federal standards existed for regulating the
operation of Indian gaming.12 9 As a result, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA")130 "to provide a statutory basis

for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."''1 To fulfill this policy, IGRA established three classes of
gaming activities, created the National Indian Gaming Commission,
and furnished a tribal-state negotiating procedure that allows states
132
some control in the regulation of Indian gaming activities.
IGRA mandates that every state enter into good faith negotiations
with the Tribe1 33 and provides that the state's failure to do so enables

a Tribe to bring suit in federal court.13 4 During the early 1990s, the
123
See Gary Sokolow, The Future of Gambling in Indian Country, 15 AM. INDLAN L. REv.
151, 163-67 (1991) (examining the competing interests of tribes, states, and the federal
government).
124 See Sherry M. Thompson, The Return of the Buffalo: An HistoricalSurvey of Reservation
Gaming in the United States and Canada,11 Aruz.J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 521, 526-27 (1994); Eric
D. Jones, Note, The Indian GamingRegulatory Act: A Forumfor ConflictAmong the PlenaryPower
of Congress, TribalSovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendment, 18 VT. L. REv. 127, 137-38 (1993)
(discussing Congress's plenary power over tribal matters, and noting that "[a]s a general
principle, state law cannot apply to Indian affairs within tribal lands"). But see United
States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 412-15 (1980) (holding that congressional
power over tribes is not absolute).
125
SeeJones, supra note 124, at 138.
126
See id.at 139.
127
480 U.S. 202 (1987).
128
Id at 221-22.
129
SeeJones, supra note 124, at 129, 132.
130 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).

131

Id. § 2702(1).

132

Id. § 2710(d); see Monaghan, supra note 3, at 109.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3).
The Act provides that:
The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over.., any cause of
action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter
into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a
Tribal-State compact.., or to conduct such negotiations in good faith ....

133
134
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Seminole Tribe attempted to negotiate with Florida state officials regarding the conduct of certain gaming activities.' 3 5 The negotiations,
however, were unsuccessful.' 3 6 As a result, the Tribe brought suit
against the State of Florida and its Governor, seeking an order directing the State to enter into negotiations and to form a compact
under the terms of IGRA. 13 7 The Tribe alleged that the defendants
had "'failed to respond in good faith to the Tribe's request for compact negotiations and did not conduct those negotiations in good
faith."' 3 8 The State of Florida raised the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity and filed a motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment
grounds. 3 9
The district court denied the State of Florida's motion to dismiss
and held that the State could be sued under IGRA.140 The court
found that IGRA abrogated a state's immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, because Congress enacted IGRA pursuant to the Indian
41
Commerce Clause.'
The Eleventh Circuitjoindy considered the Seminole decision with
PoarchBand of Creek Indians v. Alabama,142 two cases that addressed the
issue of state sovereign immunity. The court found that Congress did
not have the power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity under
IGRA.' 43 The court addressed each of the three exceptions to the
Eleventh Amendment 144 and held that none of the exceptions applied. 14 5 The court initially found that the states had neither explicitly nor implicitly consented to suit.146 Second, the court found that
while Congress clearly expressed its intent to nullify a state's sovereign
Id. § 2710(d) (7) (A) (i) (format altered).
135 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1992), reo'd, 11 F.3d
1016 (11th Cir. 1994), affd, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
136
See Monaghan, supra note 3, at 110-11 (reporting that negotiations broke down
"largely over the question of which types of gambling were permitted under Florida state
law").
137 See Seminole, 801 F. Supp. at 656. For a delineation of the IGRA provisions for
forming a compact, see infra note 168.
138
See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1020 (quoting the Tribe's complaint).
139 See Seminole 801 F. Supp. at 656 (discussing the State's argument that "Congress
does not have the power constitutionally to . . . explicitly provid[e] the Tribe a judicial
remedy against the State").
140
Id at 657-58, 663.
141
Id at 657-58 (holding that "pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, Congress
plainly had the constitutional power to abrogate"); see also supranote 124 and accompanying text (discussing the Indian Commerce Clause and Congress's power over tribal
concerns).
142
784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (dismissing suit against the Governor of Alabama); 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (dismissing suit against the State of Alabama).
143
Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1023-24.
144
See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
145
Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1022-23.
146
a at 1021-23.

WITHERING DOCTRINE OFEX PARTE YOUNG

19981

1087

immunity in IGRA, Congress did not possess the constitutional power
to effectuate the abrogation of that immunity.' 47
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the doctrine of Ex parte
Young.148 The court noted that the doctrine does not apply in two
situations, and held that both of those situations were present in the
cases before it.149 First, a plaintiff cannot use the doctrine of Ex parte
Young to compel discretionary tasks. 150 The court determined that
15 1
IGRA granted state governors discretion to negotiate with tribes.
Second, the Young exception to sovereign immunity will not apply
when the state, rather than the state official, is the real party in interest. 152 With respect to this point, the court held that the state was the
real party in interest, because IGRA only imposes duties on a statenot a state's officials. 153 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's decision in Seminole and affirmed the Poarch decisions.'5
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine two issues:
first, whether the Constitution sanctioned a congressional abrogation
exception to the Eleventh Amendment's state sovereign immunity notions, and second, whether the state officials were liable under
Young 55 The Court first held that the Indian Commerce Clause did
not grant Congress the power to authorize suits against a state and
overruled the Interstate Commerce Clause as a source for the congressional abrogation decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas.156 Second,
the Court held that a plaintiff could not use Young to enforce IGRA
15 7
against state officials.
1.

Majority Opinion

The Court did not adopt the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning to foreclose the availability of suit under Young. First, the Court ignored the
Eleventh Circuit's argument regarding official discretion. 158 Additionally, the Court only discussed the notion of the states as the exclusive party subject to suit under IGRA-the second argument upon
147
148
149

Id. at

1023-28.

Id- at 1028-29.
The doctrine of Ex parte Young will not apply in suits against state officials if the

state official is engaging in a discretionary task or if the suit is actually against the state. See
id. at 1028.
150

See i&

151

Id. at 1028-29.

152

See id. at 1029; see also supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1029.

153
154

Id,
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996).
156 Id at 60-73. The Seminole Court "found that Congress [did] not have authority
under the Constitution to make the State suable in federal court under [IGRA]." Id. at 75.
For a discussion of this portion of the Court's opinion, see articles cited supra note 3.
157 Seminole, 517 U.S. 73-76.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.
155
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which the Eleventh Circuit relied-in a footnote. 5 9 Neither of these
arguments were necessary for the Court to sustain the Governor's immunity from suit.
Instead of following the Eleventh Circuit's approach, the
Supreme Court outlined a new inquiry in the Young analysis to preempt the doctrine's application. 160 The majority based its rationale
for extending sovereign immunity protection to state officials on the
existence of a statutory remedial scheme. 16 1 The Court borrowed this
novel approach from a series of cases addressing an unrelated legal
62
issue that the Bivens cause of action presented.'
The Court adopted the approach of Schweiker v. Chilicky to establish the new limitation on Young.163 The Schweiker Court held that the
existence of a congressionally created remedial scheme precluded a
court from creating any additional remedies.' 64 The majority acknowledged that the question that the Schweiker Court answered differed from the question Seminole posed, 165 yet nonetheless chose to

apply Schweikeis principle in Seminole.
The Seminole Court determined that the existence of a complete,
legislatively-crafted remedial scheme distinguished the case from
traditional Young cases. 166 IGRA imposes a duty on a state to negotiate in good faith with Indian Tribes, 167 and it also provides an "intricate remedial scheme."1 68 The Court found that Congress intended
159 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17 (arguing that the duty that IGRA imposes, unlike other
federal statutes, applies "exclusively to 'the State[ ]'"); see supranotes 152-53 and accompanying text.
160
Seminole, 517 U.S. 73-76.
161
Id at 73-75.
162
See supraPart I.B.
165
Seminole, 517 U.S. at 74-75.
164
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) ("When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial
mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration,
we have not created additional... remedies.").
165
Schweiker answered the question whether the Court should create a new remedy
against federal officials. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 74; supra notes 111-20 and accompanying
text. However, Seminole addressed whether the Eleventh Amendment should bar a suit
against a state official. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 74.
166
Seminole, 517 U.S. at 73-75.
167
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (1994).
168
See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 73-76. IGRA's remedial procedures provide:
(A) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure
of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of
entering into a Tribal-State compact under [§ 2710(d) (3) ] or to conduct
such negotiations in good faith...
(B) (i) An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action described in subparagraph (A) (i) only after the close of the 180-day period beginning on the
date on which the Indian tribe requested the State to enter into negotiations under [§ 2710(d) (3) (A)].
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for IGRA remedies exclusively to enforce the duties that IGRA
prescribes. 16 9 The majority reasoned that allowing suits under Young
would extend IGRA beyond the boundaries that Congress intended,
because Youngwould enable the Tribe to access any prospective relief,
notjust the relief the statute detailed. 70 The Court deduced that permitting Young suits would render the remedial scheme in IGRA "superfluous," because no tribe would "suffer through the intricate
scheme of § 2710(d) (7) when more complete and more immediate
relief would be available under Young."17 1 The majority found that
the limited state liability provided under IGRA's remedial scheme signalled Congress's desire not to impose Ex parte Young liability on state
officials for violations of the duty to negotiate in good faith. 172 Thus,
the Court held that Youngwas not available to the Seminole Tribe and
73
that the Eleventh Amendment barred suit against the Governor.

(iii) If, in any action described in subparagraph (A) (i), the court finds that
the State has failed to negotiate in good faith with the Indian tribe to conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities,
the court shall order the State and the Indian Tribe to conclude such a
compact within a 60-day period....
(iv) If a State and an Indian tribe fail to conclude a Tribal-State compact...
within the 60-day period provided in the order of a court issued under
clause (iii), the Indian tribe and the State shall each submit to a mediator
appointed by the court a proposed compact that represents their last best
offer for a compact. The mediator shall select from the two proposed compacts the one which best comports with the terms of this chapter and any
other applicable Federal law and with the findings and order of the court.
(v) The mediator appointed by the court under clause (iv) shall submit to
the State and the Indian tribe the compact selected by the mediator under
clause (iv).
(vi) If a State consents to a proposed compact during the 60-day period
beginning on the date on which the proposed compact is submitted by the
mediator to the State under clause (v), the proposed compact shall be
treated as a Tribal-State compact entered into under [§ 2710(d) (8)].
(vii) If the State does not consent during the 60-day period described in
clause (vi) to a proposed compact ....the mediator shall notify the Secretary [of the Interior] and the Secretary shall prescribe, in consultation with
the Indian tribe, procedures(I) which are consistent with the proposed compact selected by the mediator under clause (iv), the provisions of this chapter, and the relevant provisions of the laws of the State ....
25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d) (7) (A) (i)-(B) (vii) (format altered) (footnote omitted).
169 Seminole 517 U.S. at 74-76. Relying on Schweiker, the Court found that Congress's
authority constituted a special factor counselling hesitation. See supra text accompanying
notes 108; supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
170 Seminole 517 U.S. at 74-76.
171 Id. at 75.
172 Id at 75-76 ("[T]he fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a liability
which is significantly more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the state officer under Ex parte Young strongly indicates that Congress had no wish to create the latter
under [the remedial provisions of IGRA].").
173 I& at 76.
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Souter's Dissent

Justice Souter's dissent responded to the majority's approach to
the Ex parte Young doctrine. 174 He began by elaborating on both the
history and lineage of Young as well as the important role it serves
today in assuring the supremacy of federal law. 175 He argued that
Young provides "a sensible way to reconcile the Court's expansive view
of immunity expressed in Hans with the principles embodied in the
Supremacy Clause and Article III."176
Affirming the importance of the Ex parte Young doctrine, Justice
Souter expressed a reluctance to alter the doctrine's application or
viability. 177 He argued that the doctrine is a necessary element of the
United States federal structure of government' 78 He reasoned that if
the Court normally required a clear statement by Congress to alter the
constitutional balance between the states and the federal government,
the Court should also require an equally clear statement to "block the
customary application of Ex parte Young."1 79 Unlike the majority,
which held that simply having a comprehensive remedial scheme suffices to indicate a congressional desire to thwart application of
Young,'ISJustice Souter posited that Congress's cognizance of the laws
8
it enacts renders it capable of altering the law if it so intends.' '
Furthermore, the dissent attacked the Court's reliance on

Schweiker's comprehensive remedial scheme argument. Justice Souter
maintained that the Bivens issue, embodied in Schweiker, differs from
the Young issue "in every significant respect."' 8 2 First, the two issues
are distinguishable on their facts.' 8 3 The Court in Schweiker faced the
issue of whether to create a supplemental Bivens action against federal
officials individually.' 8 4 In contrast, the dissent asserted that Seminole
174
Id. at 169-82 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens authored a separate dissent,
but he did not discuss the majority's decision with respect to the Ex parte Young doctrine.
Id. at 76-100 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175 Id.at 169-75 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176
Id, at 169-70 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177
Md at 174-75 (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting that the Ex pare Young doctrine
"should not be easily displaced, if indeed it is displaceable at all, for it marks the frontier of
the enforceability of federal law against sometimes competing state policies").
178
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The decision in Ex parte Young and the historic docplays a foundational role in American constitutionalism ....[Young]
trine it embodies ....
is nothing short of 'indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and
the rule of law.'" (citation omitted)).
I (Souter, J., dissenting).
179
180
See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
181
Seminole 517 U.S. at 174-75 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Lit is 'difficult to believe that
...Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it
would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest.'" (quoting Dellmuth
v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230-31 (1989) (omission in original))).
182
Id at 176-77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
183
See id (Souter, J., dissenting).
184
See supranotes 111-20 and accompanying text
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did not address the need to create a "novel rule" for supplying a remedy.' 8 5 Instead, the dissent claimed that the issue before the Court
18 6
was purely jurisdictional.
Second, Justice Souter discussed the majority's claim that tribes
would always bring suit under Young, thus rendering the provisions of
IGRA superfluous and unnecessary. 8 7 The dissent, once again, focused on the jurisdictional nature' 8 8 of Young claims and dismissed
the argument that suits brought under Young displace statutory procedures.'8 9 Justice Souter also argued that Young does not necessarily
provide a "free-standing remedy" and urged that Young is "subject to
the restrictions otherwise imposed on federal remedial schemes."' 9 0
He drew an analogy to federal habeas law, which contains statutory
remedies and provides evidence that the Ex parte Young doctrine's use
in habeas proceedings does not circumvent the statutory habeas
remedies.191
Finally, the dissent attacked the claim that Congress intended for
suits under IGRA to provide a cause of action against a state, but not
against state officers. 19 2 According to Justice Souter, the majority
based its argument on a strict reading of the statutory language of
IGRA that provided federal jurisdiction when the state failed to enter
into the particular negotiations. 93 The dissent first countered that
this claim was grounded on a false presumption that a Young suit
would displace the procedural remedies of IGRA.' 94 Moreover, the
dissent noted that "there is nothing incongruous about a duty imposed on a 'State' that Congress intended to be effectuated by an order directed to an appropriate state official." 195 Therefore, any
language conferring a duty on a state would equally apply to a state
official.
Seminole, 517 U.S. at 177 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 175-77 (Souter, J., dissenting). The doctrine of Ex parte Young addresses a
court's jurisdictional obligation to satisfy the provisions of Article III of the Constitution.
See i&. at 177; see also Monaghan, supra note 3, at 115 (recognizing that the nature of the Ex
parle Young doctrine is jurisdictional rather than remedial).
187 Seminole, 517 U.S. at 177-79 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority suggests that "Young would allow litigants to ignore the 'intricate procedures' of IGRA7).
188 IH. (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Young stands "for a jurisdictional rule by
which paramount federal law may be enforced in a federal court by substituting a nonimmune party (the state officer) for an immune one (the State itself)").
189 I&at 179 (SouterJ., dissenting) ("Congress hasjust as much authority to regulate
suits when jurisdiction depends on Young as it has to regulate when Young is out of the
jurisdictional picture.... Young does not bar the application of IGRA's procedures.").
190 Id- at 178-79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
191 Id. (Souter,J., dissenting).
192
d. at 179-82 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193 Id. at 179-80 (Souter, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 180-81 (Souter, J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 181 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185

186
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In addition to launching a multifaceted attack on the Court's use
of Schweiker,Justice Souter discussed the approach that courts should
take when faced with an ambiguous statute. 196 He stated that courts
should interpret statutes to "avoid constitutional infirmity." 197 He advised that courts should adopt "any reasonable construction of a statute that would eliminate the need to confront a contested
constitutional issue."19 8 The dissent concluded that adhering to
either of these statutory construction rules would enable the Court to
adopt the Young approach without altering the constitutional underpinnings of the Ex parte Young doctrine. 99
B.

Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe

The second case in which the Court addressed a limitation on the
Ex parte Young doctrine also arose in the context of an Indian tribe's
suit against a state official. 20 0 The Coeur d'Alene Tribe brought suit
in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, claiming
ownership of the "submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene
and of various navigable rivers and streams that form part of its water
system." 20 ' The Tribe named the State of Idaho and several state officials and agencies as defendants. The Tribe sought tifle to the property and declaratory and injunctive relief to establish the exclusive
20 2
right of the Tribe to enjoy the land free from state regulation.
In the district court, the defendants moved to dismiss the Tribe's
suit on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The district court granted the
motion with respect to all the claims on the ground that the claims
against the State of Idaho and the state agencies could not lie under
the Eleventh Amendment. 20 3 Additionally, the district court determined that the claims against the state officials to quiet tide and for
declaratory relief "were the functional equivalents of a damages award
Id. at 182 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). The constitutional issues in Seminole were "the place of
state sovereign immunity in federal question cases and the status of Union Gas." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
199 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
200 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997); see also Matthew Berry, Case
Note, A Treasure Not Worth Salvaging, 106 YALE L.J. 241 (1996) (discussing the issues that
the Court would face in the Coeur d'Alene case).
201 Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Idaho 1992), rev'd in part
(claim against state officials) and aff/d in part (claim against state and state agencies), 42
F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd (state officials), 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997); see Robert H.
196
197

Freilich et al., The Return to StateAutonomy: The Eleventh Amendment and OtherKey Decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court and Lower Courts Affecting State and Local Government 1995-96, 28 URB.
LAw. 563, 604-05 (1996) (discussing the basis of the claim that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe

brought).
202
203

See Coeur dAlene, 117 S. Ct. at 2032.
Coeur d'Alene, 798 F. Supp. at 1446-48.
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against the State," and thus the Eleventh Amendment barred them. 2 0 4
Finally, the court dismissed the injunctive relief claim against the officials because the court found that the state was the rightful owner of
the lands and, therefore, the proper party to regulate the lands'
use.

20 5

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Eleventh
Amendment barred all claims against the state and its agencies.2 0 6
However, it found the Ex parte Young doctrine capable of preserving
the declaratory and injunctive claims made by the Tribe.2 0 7 The
Ninth Circuit determined that the state had engaged in a continuing
violation of federal law because it had interfered with the Tribe's ownership rights based on an executive order, which a federal statute had
ratified, granting title to the Tribe.2 08 The court remanded the case
to the district court for consideration of the claims for declaratory and
20 9
injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the narrow
question "whether the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from
hearing the Tribe's claim."2 10 Specifically, the Court confined its inquiry to whether the Tribe could proceed on its claim for declaratory
and injunctive relief against the state officials. 21 ' Although five Justices agreed that the suit against the state officials could not proceed
in federal court, no rationale for this conclusion commanded a
majority.
1. PrincipalOpinion
Justice Kennedy who wrote the principal opinion, which Justice
Rehnquist joined, further limited the applicability of Young by expanding on the recent Seminole decision. Justice Kennedy revisited the
continuing federalism debate and attempted to redraw Young's jurisdictional threshold to "ensure that the doctrine of sovereign immunity remains meaningful, while also giving recognition to the need to
prevent violations of federal law."2 1 2 Thus, the principal opinion reaffirms the Seminole decision and suggests that the prospective-retroactive distinction that Edelman v. Jordan,which may no longer be good
Id. at 1449.
IM. at 1452 (deciding the issue regarding injunctive relief against state officials on
the merits).
206
Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1247 (9th Cir. 1994).
207 Id- at 1251-55.
208 Id.
204
205

209

Id.

210

Coeur d/Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2032.
Id. at 2033.
Id. at 2034.

211
212
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law, established is an "empty formalism" contrary to the dictates of the
2 13
Eleventh Amendment.
Justice Kennedy began by discussing two instances when Young is
applicable. First, Young permits suits "where there is no state forum
available to vindicate federal interests."214 Kennedy quoted from one
of Alexander Hamilton's FederalistPapers. "' [T] here ought always to be
a constitutional method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions."' 2 15 The principal opinion also relied on the facts and circumstances of the Court's Young decision for support. 2 16 However, the
opinion stated that in the present suit "Idaho's courts are open to
hear the case" and, thus, no other judicial forum was necessary for
2 17
resolving the dispute.
Second, regardless of the existence of a state forum, Young permits indirect suits against states "when the case calls for the interpretation of federal law."'2 18 This is the federalism issue on which most of
the Court's debate focuses. Kennedy first examined the history of the
federal and state judicial systems and acknowledged the adequacy of
both fora for resolving federal questions. 219 Next, he asserted the
need for states to control state administrative action and state officials. 220 Based on these two considerations, Justice Kennedy outlined
a balancing test that weighs the competing interests of federalism at
22 1
issue in suits against state officials.
The Coeurd'Alene principal opinion gives new life to the considerations against promoting the supremacy of federal law by focusing its
interest in "'accommodat[ing] ...the constitutional immunity of the
States."' 22 2 Kennedy stated that the Court has consistently incorporated this balancing approach, which arguably accords a state's interest more weight, into its Young decisions. 223 The opinion concluded
that an important consideration of the Court in determining whether
213
214
215

1&
Id. at 2035.

218

Id.

219
220

Id. at 2036-37.
Id. at 2037.

Id. (quoting THE FEDEPALIsr No. 80, at 475 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
216 Id. at 2035-36 (noting that "the common-law injury framework [employed by] the
Young Court underscored the inadequacy of state procedures for vindicating the constitutional rights at stake").
217 Id. at 2036.

221
Id. at 2037-38. The Court reasoned that the decision in Seminole upset the once
prevailing Edelman distinction of suits seeking prospective injunctive relief and that the

determination now "depend[s] upon the particular context." Id. at 2038.
222 Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984)).
223
Id. at 2038-40.

1998]

WTHERINGDOCTRINE OF EX PARTE YOUNG

1095

to allow Young suits is, and has always been, the impact that the partic2 24
ular suit will have on the State.
Moreover, Coeur d'Alends principal opinion relied heavily on the
Seminole decision. Seminole incorporated the special factors counseling
hesitation inquiry into the Young doctrine. Using this recent change
as a departure point, the principal opinion in Coeur d'Alene further
modified the Ex parte Young doctrine: when deciding whether Young
would allow a suit to go forward, courts should consider the context in
which the suit arose.2 25 Significantly, the principal opinion acknowledged that it had departed from Edelman and altered the Ex parte
Young doctrine. 226 In defense of this departure, Justice Kennedy argued that "the Youngfiction is an exercise in line-drawing[, and t]here
is no reason why the line cannot be drawn to reflect the real interest
of States consistent with the clarity and certainty appropriate to the
Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional inquiry. "227
In Coeur d'Alene, Justice Kennedy found that the relief the Tribe
sought extended beyond the power that the Ex parte Young doctrine
accorded the federal courts. His opinion compared the declaratory
and injunctive relief that the Tribe requested to a "retroactive levy
upon funds in [the State's] treasury,"228 because the Tribe had asked
for the "functional equivalent of [a] quiet tile action. '229 Given that
the functional equivalent quality of the relief infringes on the State's
sovereign immunity to a greater degree than the supremacy of federal
law warrants, the principal opinion determined that the balancing test
230
must weigh against a Young exception.
2.

O'Connor'sConcurrence

While departing from the approach of the principal opinion, Justice O'Connor, along with Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote in support of the judgment of the principal opinion.2 3 1 However, the
concurrence disagreed with the case-by-case balancing approach that
the principal opinion articulated.
O'Connor focused on the functional equivalent language of the
principal opinion and denied the Tribe's claim for a Young exception
to the Eleventh Amendment because of the suit's similarity to a quiet
224

Id. at 2038-39 (referencing Edelman v. Jordan, Quem v. Jordan, and Miliken v.

Bradey).
225
226

Id. at 2039.
Ia at 2039-40.

227

Id.

228

Id. at 2043.

229

Id. at 2040.

230

Id. at 2040-43.

231

Id. at 2043-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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title action. 23 2 However, the concurrence stopped short of instituting
a "case-specific analysis" of the context of the suit.233 O'Connor rea-

soned that such an approach "unnecessarily recharacterizes and nar23 4
rows much of [the Court's] Youngjurisprudence."
The O'Connor concurrence criticized the approach and ultimate
conclusion of the principal opinion. Specifically, the concurrence
noted that, not only did the principal opinion rely on a paucity of
cases, it also misinterpreted those cases.23 5 The cases that the princi23 6
pal opinion cited do not indicate the use of a balancing approach.
"Rather, [those cases] establish only that a Young suit is available
where a plaintiff alleges an ongoingviolation of federal law, and where
23 7
the relief sought is prospective rather than retrospective."
Additionally, the concurrence noted the precariousness of basing
a new approach to Young cases on a "single citation [to] the Court's
opinion last Term in Seminole Tribe."23 8 While supporting the Seminole
decision, O'Connor argued that the principal opinion interpreted
that decision too broadly. 23 9 Instead, the concurrence would limit
that holding to bar a Young suit only where "Congress [has] prescribe [d] a detailed remedial scheme for enforcement of a statutory
24 0

right."

The concurrence advocated continued use of the "straightforward inquiry" that the Court articulated in Edelman. This approach
properly considers all interests, including the importance of state interests, when deciding whether to permit a Young exception.2 4 1 Despite the concurrence's support of the Edelman approach, the
concurrence joined with the principal opinion in finding that the suit
242
could not go forward.
3.

Souter's Dissent

Justice Souter wrote on behalf of the dissenting Justices in a sequel to his Seminole dissent.243 Souter argued that the Coeur d'Alene
Id. at 2043-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
R at 2045 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id (O'Connor, J., concurring).
235 I9 at 2046-47 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[The Court's] case law simply does not
support the proposition that federal courts must evaluate the importance of the federal
right at stake before permitting an officer's suit to proceed.").
236
See supranotes 223-24 and accompanying text.
237
Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2046 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
238 Id. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
239
Id (O'Connor, J., concurring).
240
Id (O'Connor, J., concurring).
241 See infra Part III.A.2.
242
Id at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
243
Id. at 2047-59 (SouterJ., dissenting). Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined
the dissent.
232
233
234
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Tribe's suit fell clearly within the scope of the Ex parte Young doctrine
and that the Court should have permitted the suit to proceed in a
federal forum. 244 The dissent further criticized the new approach
that the principal opinion offered and protested that the judgment of
both the principal and concurring opinions were unwarranted and
245
improper.
Justice Souter began by discussing the appropriateness of applying the Exparte Young doctrine to the Tribe's claim. He identified the
two conditions for bringing suits under Young first, the plaintiffs must
assert a violation of federal law; and second, the plaintiffs must seek
prospective, injunctive relief.246 He argued that both of the conditions were met in this case.2 47 First, the Tribe asserted the violation of
a federal law, namely, "the Executive Order, later ratified by Congress,
...[giving the Tribe] beneficial interest ...in the beds and banks of
all navigable water within the reservation, including the submerged
248
land under Lake Coeur d'Alene."
Second, the Tribe sought to enjoin the State from regulating the
use of navigable waters, which is the type of relief that Young permits. 249 While acknowledging that a grant of such relief would pose
significant consequences to the State, Souter pointed out that these
consequences would occur whenever Young applies. 250 His dissent
drew an analogy to Young, and argued that relief leaving a state "unable to enforce statutory railroad rate regulation," or unable to enforce navigable water regulations, will not prevent the Young doctrine
from applying. 251 Ultimately, Justice Souter argued that "[i]f the
Tribe were to prove what it claims, it would establish 'precisely the
type of continuing violation for which a remedy may permissibly be
fashioned under Young.'252
Souter also discussed the reasons why the principal and concurring opinions incorrectly held Young inapplicable. His dissent *noted
that these opinions focused on two points. With respect to the plurality's argument that the Tribe's suit is the functional equivalent of a
suit quieting title, 253 Souter explained that "an officer suit implicating
Id at 2048 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id (Souter, J., dissenting).
246 Id (Souter, J., dissenting).
247 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
248
Id. at 2049 (Souter, J., dissenting).
249 See id. at 2050-51 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the "complaint asks for just
such relief' as Young requires).
250 Id. at 2051 (Souter, J., dissenting).
251 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
252
I& at 2052 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 282
(1986)).
253
See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
244
245
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title is no more or less the 'functional equivalent' of an action against
254
the government than any other Young suit."

Second, both the principal and concurring opinions argued in
support of the judgment that "more than mere title [to the submerged lands] would be affected if the Tribe were to prevail."2 55 The
principal opinion claimed that granting the Tribe's injunction would
adversely affect the "dignity and status" of the State.2 5 6 Moreover,
both the principal and concurring opinions expressed concern that if
the Court infringed on the State's regulatory power, there would be
too great an intrusion into state sovereignty.2 57 Justice Souter conceded that there is a "significant sovereign interest in regulating its
submerged lands," but found that a state "has no legitimate sovereign
interest in regulating submerged lands located outside state borders." 258 Therefore, if the submerged lands are located within the
2 59
SouTribe's land, the Tribe does not impugn a sovereign interest.

ter's dissent again looked to the Young decision for support 2 60 and
determined that a state's interest in regulatory jurisdiction did not
2 61
provide a sufficient basis for displacing Young.
Finally, Justice Souter analyzed several additional arguments that
the principal opinion alone offered as reasons for not applying the
doctrine of Exparte Young. First, the principal opinion found that the
"state officials" complied with state law, and, therefore, a court should
consider them as the "state" for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.2

62

Such a finding would bar officer suits-including the instant

Id. at 2053 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent made several analogies:
States are functionally barred from imposing a railroad rate found unconstitutional when enforced by a state officer, States are functionally barred
from withholding welfare benefits when their officers have violated federal
law on timely payment; States are functionally barred from locking up prisoners whom their wardens are told to release. There is nothing unique
about the consequences of an officer suit involving title
....
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
255
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
256
See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting the principal opinion).
257
See id. at 2053-54 (Souter, J., dissenting). The State's regulatory power will only be
disrupted if the State, as opposed to the Tribe, possesses sovereign authority over the disputed lands. See id. at 2054 (Souter, J., dissenting).
258 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
259
See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
260
The dissent looked to the facts of Young and argued:
Young was a suit to enjoin [the enforcement ofl a state statute regulating
railroad rates ....One would have difficulty imagining a state activity any
more central to state sovereignty than such economic regulation .... A
State obliged to choose between power to regulate a lake and lake bed on
an Indian reservation and power to regulate economic affairs ...would not
(knowing nothing more) choose the lake.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
261
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
262
See id (Souter, J., dissenting).
254
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case-from federal court. The dissent found that most cases employing the Exparte Young doctrine are against state officers acting in compliance with state law. 263 In fact, the typical claim in such suits is that
26 4
the state law itself violates federal law.
A second argument that the principal opinion advanced was that
the injunctive relief the Tribe sought was "functionally equivalent to a
money judgment and thus would amount to an impermissibly retrospective remedy."265 In other words, this argument claimed that the
remedy the Tribe sought was "intrusive." 266 However, the dissent
noted that "every case decided under Ex parte Young, including the
original," was necessarily intrusive, and affected the State's sovereign
267
interests.
The third argument the principal opinion offered, without the
support of the concurrence, was that the federal-question jurisdiction
provided under Young supplements that which a state forum provides.2 68 As with the prior arguments that the principal opinion advanced, the dissent succinctly dispensed with this final argument by
stating that "[f]ederal question jurisdiction... addresses not the adequacy of a state judicial system, but the responsibility of federal courts
2 69
to vindicate what is supposed to be controlling federal law."
III
ANALYSs

A.

The Importance of the Ex parne Young Doctrine

Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is deeply entrenched in the
current Supreme Court. Although a complete overhaul of the Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence may be in order,2 70 the Court is
not in a position to take such drastic action at this time. It is unlikely
that the Court will overturn Hans v. Louisiana or any of the subse2 71
quent cases supporting state sovereign immunity in the near future.
Therefore, the law providing for the protection of federal rights from
state intrusion needs to remain at least as it was before Seminole. The
263
264

d.

(Souter, J., dissenting).

See id. (SouterJ., dissenting) (noting that the Supremacy Clause makes federal law
controlling).
265
Id at 2055 (Souter, J., dissenting).
266 1& (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting principal opinion).
267 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
268
See i&/(Souter, J., dissenting).
269
d. (Souter, J., dissenting).
270
See generaUyJackson, supranote 33, at 498 ("The correctness of Hans has long been
questioned, by scholars and judges alike, as unwarranted by the constitutional text and as
unduly restrictive of federal judicial power to vindicate the supremacy of federal law.").
271
SeeAnn Althouse, Tapping the State Court Resource, 44 VAND.L. Rxrv. 953, 968 (1991)
(noting that the diversity argument "is unlikely to win enough votes [in the Supreme
Court) to succeed in the near future").

1100

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1068

doctrine of Ex parte Young must survive in order to enable individuals
to assert their federal rights, and the Edelman v. Jordan decision reflects the proper approach to that doctrine.
1. Young Protects FederalRights
The Ex parte Young doctrine is necessary for the vindication of
federal rights in federal courts and for the assured compliance of state
officials with the supreme authority of the United States. 272 Unless
and until the Court overturns Hans and returns state sovereign immunity to its proper place within the scheme of the Constitution, 273 the
doctrine of Ex parte Young must remain and continue to ensure the
2 74
supremacy of federal law.

Legal scholars recognize Young as the "primary method of limiting the effect of the Eleventh Amendment and of ensuring state compliance with federal law." 275 When a state violates the Constitution or

a federal statute, the ability to enjoin those state officers responsible
for that violation is of the utmost importance. Without Young's grant
of power, enabling the judiciary to sidestep the current Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, the authority of the United
States to maintain the supremacy and proper operation of its laws
276
would be drastically limited.
The doctrine of Ex parte Young arms individuals with a sword to
assert their federal rights. 2 77 Without Young, many plaintiffs would
lack the ability to present their issues before a federal court.2 7 8 If the
272
273

See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1984).
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
274 SeeJackson, supra note 33, at 510-11 (arguing that the "harshness of the Hans immunity rule has long been mitigated by the availability of injunctive relief against state
officers to prevent violations of federal law"); see also Low &JE=ESn,
supra note 12, at 185
("The challenge facing the modern Supreme Court has been to accommodate the [conventional view] suggested by Hans with the need for some means of enforcing civil rights
against states.").
275 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 51, § 7.5.1, at 392; see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 169-71 (1996) (Souter,J., dissenting) ("Youngprovided, as it does today, a sensible way
to reconcile the Court's expansive view of immunity expressed in Hanswith the principles
embodied in the Supremacy Clause and Article HI."); WRiHT, supranote 51, § 48, at 312
(Young "seems indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the
rule of law."). But see Currie, supra note 7, at 547 (disagreeing with the claim that Youngis a
necessary corollary of Hans).
276 SeeJAcoBs, supranote 1, at 153 (describing an objection to state sovereign immunity because such immunity "frustrates the performance of one of the most essential [federal] government functions, the dispensation of justice according to law").
277 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) ("[Young] has permitted the Civil
War amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for
those whom they were designed to protect.").
278 SeeJackson, supra note 33, at 511 ("Availability of [the Ex parte Youngdoctrine] has
long fulfilled the function of assuring that, for violations of rights, there is some remedy
available, even if not a perfect remedy or a remedy that is in fact available to all who are
injured.").
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Young decision had not provided an exception for suits against state
officers, the only way to test the constitutionality of a statute would be
to violate the statute and to raise the unconstitutionality of the statute
as a defense to any subsequent prosecution for that violation. Similarly, without Young, other individuals perversely would be forced to
depend on a state bringing a prosecution against them to have the
opportunity to appear in federal court and challenge the state's practices. Therefore, Young provides a necessary outlet for individuals
whose rights a state or state official has harmed or violated.
However, the courts balance individuals' federal rights with the
competing issue of state sovereign immunity. 279 The Eleventh
Amendment provides a shield to protect states from suit.28 0 The

courts have attempted to rationalize the protection afforded to the
states on historical, political, and conceptual grounds, but these bases
do not yield an adequate explanation of state immunity.2 8 ' The current conception is that lawsuits should not encumber states as sovereigns.28 2 Although there is no complete justification for the existence
of sovereign immunity, it continues to survive as a valid defense to
suits against the State.
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence currently maintains two
competing protections-the Eleventh Amendment itself provides a
shield for states and the Ex parte Young doctrine affords a sword for
individuals. Without Young, however, the sword disappears. The Ex
parte Young doctrine balances the interests of the individuals wielding
swords and the states raising shields to determine when an individual's suit may proceed against a state official despite state sovereign
immunity. The Court properly set that balance in Edelman v.
28 3
Jordan.
2.

Edelman Properly BalancedFederalRights Against State
Sovereign Immunity

The Edelman Court reconciled the competing interests of federal
rights and state sovereign immunity by limiting Young suits to those
seeking prospective relief.28 4 As the Court in Pennhurst explained,

"Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time
preserving to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the
279
280
281

See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
See supra Part I.A.1.
SeeJACoBs, supranote 1, at 150-55 (analyzing each of the three rationalizations that

courts use to support immunity, but concluding that they provide an unsatisfactory explanation of the need and role of state sovereign immunity).
282 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text
283 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
284 See supra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
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States." 28 5 Edelman's policy of allowing only imposition of prospective
relief against state officials enables a plaintiff to effectively sue a state
in spite of the Eleventh Amendment. 28 6 However, the prospective
quality of the relief allowed in Young suits does not require a state to
make amends for its prior actions; it merely ensures that states will
287
adhere to federal law in the fature.
The limitation that Edelman places on the doctrine of Ex parte
2 8
Young is consistent with the underlying purposes of the doctrine. 3
Young attempts to restore the supremacy of federal law in cases where
a state official violates that law.2 8 9 To accomplish Young's purpose,

courts actively took steps to end the federal violations and could not
simply award compensatory damages and rely on the deterrent effect,
2 90
hoping that such relief would ensure the supremacy of federal law.

Edelman adheres to the Young policy by limiting federal courts' ability
to decide cases against state officials to those suits that seek prospective, injunctive relief to end the violations.2 91 Edelman succeeds in fostering the policies underlying Young, namely assuring the protection
and supremacy of federal rights by requiring courts to engage in a
285
286

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (explaining that prospective

"[r] emedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law").
287
See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146
(1993) (asserting that Young"carvied] out a necessary exception to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.... [However,] the exception is narrow... [and] does not permit judgments
against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past." (citations
omitted)).
288
See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 146-47 & n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see Harris &
Kenny, supra note 40, at 660-62 (criticizing the Edelman holding for being "completely contrary to the spirit and rationale of Ex parte Young").
289
See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986). The policies underlying the decision in Young include the following:
Young's applicability has been tailored to conform as precisely as possible to
those specific situations in which it is "necessary to permit the federal
courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to 'the
supreme authority of the United States.'" Consequently, Young has been
focused on cases in which a violation of federal law by a state official is
ongoing as opposed to cases in which federal law has been violated at one
time or over a period of time in the past, as well as on cases in which the
relief against the state official directly ends the violation of federal law as
opposed to cases in which that relief is intended indirectly to encourage
compliance with federal law through deterrence or directly to meet thirdparty interests such as compensation.
Id. at 277-78 (citations omitted).
290
See Green, 474 U.S. at 68 ("Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of
federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that
law. But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of
the Eleventh Amendment." (citations omitted)).
291
See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
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line-drawing process to determine whether the relief is prospective or
retrospective.292

B.

The Existence of Alternative Remedies Should Not Limit the
Ex parte Young Doctrine

Suits against state officials for their unconstitutional or illegal actions raise concerns of state sovereign immunity and individual constitutional rights. The judiciary addressed these two concerns with the
approach it developed in Young and its progeny.29 3 This approach
provided an accurate and adequate balancing of federalism principles
and did not require the Court's additional modification in Seminole.
The Seminole decision does not follow the policies that the Court
announced in previous cases addressing suits against state officials.
Moreover, the reasoning of the Bivens cause of action, which serves as
the Court's only precedent for further limiting the application of the
Ex parte Young doctrine, does not support the Seminole decision.
1.

Contravention of the Policies UnderlyingYoung and the Eleventh
Amendment

No additional limitation of Young is necessary to ensure full contemplation of the interests of either the state or the individual. The
Edelman Court recognized the importance of each of the interests, balanced them, and thereby satisfied each of the interests' underlying
policies.2 94 The Court in Seminole rejects Youngs longstanding judicial
policy by prohibiting relief if a statutory scheme supplies comprehen295
sive remedies.
292 This Note argues that Edelman provides the proper inquiry under Young. Edelman's
distinction between prospective and retrospective relief assures the future protection of
federal rights and that the preservation of federal interests remains the central concern in
Youngsuits. See Ann Althouse, When to Believe a LegalFiction: FederalInterests and the Eleventh
Amendment 40 HASTNGs L.J. 1123, 1144 (1989) ("It is not that the cost of prospective relief

is inconsequential compared with retrospective relief, but that [prospective relief] more
sharply and directly connects to the federal interest embodied in the particular federal law upon
which the case is based." (emphasis added)). Despite the appropriateness of the Edelman
inquiry, there are arguably other approaches to control suits under Young. See id. n.88
(suggesting that the Court fashion a limitation similar to qualified immunity). Several
commentators, however, believe that Edelman is unnecessary and that its distinction between prospective and retrospective relief is unsatisfactory. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 26,
at 69-72 (discussing how the Ex parte Young doctrine wastes "vast amounts of [a federal
court's] energy in determining . . . whether the relief sought is permissible under
Edelman").

293 See supra Part IA2.
294 See Green, 474 U.S. at 68-70 (acknowledging that Young and Edelman established the
proper balance between the state sovereignty principles embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and the vindication of federal rights that the constitutional plan envisioned).
295 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-76 (1996).
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The Seminole Court's sole impetus for this qualification is the presumption that Congress did not intend to permit Young suits where it
had created statutory remedies. 2 96 This rationale questions Congress's ability to legislate accurately the laws that it creates. If Congress wanted to prohibit suits relying on Young when it provided a
statutory remedial scheme, it would have promulgated such a limiting
provision.2 97 However, Congress, during the ninety years since the
Young decision, has never passed legislation restricting federal courts
from providing prospective relief under Young.298 Yet Seminole would
lead one to believe that in passing IGRA, Congress, for the first time,
manifested a desire to preclude the judicially created Young approach
299
for ensuring the supremacy of Congress's own law.

Edelman limited the Ex parte Young doctrine, but that limitation
effectively struck the necessary balance between the competing interests at issue.30 0 The further limitations that Seminole imposed do not
improve upon or more accurately resolve that balance.3 01 The Seminole Court suggested that Congress must state explicitly when a Young
suit will be permissible. 30 2 However, such an approach to statutory
construction does not necessarily reflect congressional intent. The
Court presumably has no interest in enforcing federal statutory law
beyond Congress's intent, but the Seminole approach requires that
courts enforce the statutory remedies even when there is no express
or implied indication in the statute that such remedy is to be exclusive. Moreover, if Seminole requires that Congress specifically include
Young as a permissible remedy within a statute, virtually none of the
current federal statutory rights will be enforceable. The Seminole apSee supra notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Althouse, supra note 292, at
1181 ("'Congress has enacted many statutes... on the assumption that States were immune from suits by individuals,' thus making it unreasonable suddenly to interpret the
statutes as though the assumption never existed." (quoting Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
298
See Gibson, supra note 10, at 214 ("[A]pparently for the first time, the Court considered congressional intent to be relevant to the question of whether a suit naming a state
official as a defendant should be viewed instead as being an action against the state itself
and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment." (footnotes omitted)).
296
297

299
300

See id.

The jurisdictional bar on anything other than prospective relief enables federal
courts to accomplish the goal of ending violations of federal law, while simultaneously
protecting the state interest of an undisturbed public fisc. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
301 The Court has permitted prospective relief in spite of prohibiting retroactive relief
because "the importance of ensuring compliance with federal law in the future simply
outweighs compensation for past injuries." Althouse, supra note 292, at 1141. Seminole's
further restriction on prospective relief does not accord with the need to protect the sanctity and vitality of constitutional and statutory federal law. See supra Part III.A.1.
302 Congressional silence during the life of the Ex parte Young doctrine should be adequate for the Court to determine that the proper balance existed prior to Seminole. See
supra note 298 and accompanying text.
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proach does not comport with the duty of the federal courts to ensure
the supremacy of federal law.
Based on Seminole, the vagaries of the legislature will dictate
whether a Young suit will lie. If Congress includes a remedial scheme
as part of its legislation, state officials can violate federal law with the
knowledge that the only remedy available to an aggrieved party Will be
the remedy that the statute provides. This result directly contravenes
the overarching goal of the Young doctrine to "permit the federal
courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to
the 'supreme authority of the United States."'3 03 The policies for limiting the doctrine in Edelman are sufficiently different from the approach in Seminole to persuade against further limitation of the Ex
parte Young doctrine.
2.

Improper Reliance on Schweiker v. Chilicky

The differing purposes and premises between the Ex parte Young
and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics
doctrines, which the Seminole decision combines, make it difficult to
justify the Seminole majority's position. Bivens deals with implying a
cause of action to fill a gap in constitutional protection of individual
rights.30 4 The Seminole Court did not fully consider the implications of
relying on Bivens to create an exception to Young. In Bivens actions,
the judicially created remedy only applies to officials of the federal
government.3 0 5 A federal court's imposition of sanctions against the
federal government does not implicate federalism concerns directly,
because there is no effect on state sovereignty.3 0 6 By contrast, Young
allows federal courts to impose sanctions on the states through suits
against state officials. If Congress meant to change the Ex parte Young
doctrine, it would have clearly done so because a change in the doctrine would directly affect the extent to which states are accountable
307
for violations of federal law.
Moreover, Bivens allows monetary damages while Young involves
only prospective relief,30 8 These remedies trigger completely differ303
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (quoting Ex
parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)); see supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
304
See Rosen, supra note 92, at 338 ("The Supreme Court in Bivens felt compelled to
fill a void left by Congress in the Civil Rights Statutes." (footnote omitted)).
305 Bivens actions only provide relief against federal officials. These actions do not
affect states and state officials. See id. at 343 (explaining that Bivens actions' "primary purpose has always been to redress constitutional deprivations committed by federal officials"). But see JAcoBs, supra note 1, at 110-11 (recognizing that courts regularly
incorporate state official immunity analyses into issues involving federal officials and vice
versa).
306 See supra note 305.
307 See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
308 See supraPart I.A.2-B.
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ent concerns. The Supreme Court created Bivens actions for the "express and sole purpose of providing a damages remedy to the victims
of constitutional torts."3 0 9 The factual circumstances of Bivens cases,
as well as the judiciary's intended application of the Bivens doctrine,
suggest that the remedies that Bivens cases award are always retroactive. 31 0 Even though Bivens relied on the proposition that "federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done,"3 1' in practice, the only feasible remedy to apply in Bivens actions is compensatory monetary damages.
Bivens and Schweiker only deal with damages remedies, not prospective relief.31 2 In Schweiker, the plaintiffs brought a Bivens action
"seeking consequential damages and damages for emotional distress."31 3 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has interpreted Schweikerto affect
only a court's ability to prescribe damages remedies: "[C]ourts must
withhold their power to fashion damages remedies when Congress has
put in place a comprehensive system to administer public rights, has
'not inadvertently' omitted damages remedies for certain claimants,
and has not plainly expressed an intention that the courts preserve
Bivens remedies. '31 4 Furthermore, "the federal judiciary 'has generally exercised extreme caution' in fashioning monetary remedies for
violations of individual constitutional rights." 31 5 Even if one accepted
Bivens and Schweiker as sufficient precedent for Seminole, the Ex parte
Young doctrine does not impugn the judiciary's exercise of caution in
awarding damages. The Court in Edelman went beyond merely instructing courts to be cautious in awarding monetary damages by ensuring that the Ex parte Young doctrine would not allow such
retroactive damages. Edelman only permits suits seeking prospective
6
relief.31
The remedies that the Ex parte Young doctrine allows are purely
prospective. The Bivens line of cases has left unanswered the question
whether "remedial procedures also preempt judicial power to provide
equitable relief for constitutional violations." 31 7 The existence of a re309
Rosen, supra note 92, at 343; see also Smith, supra note 101, at 668 (maintaining that
the Court decided Bivens "to compensate victims of unconstitutional official acts.... A
Bivens-type action, therefore, accomplishes its purpose only when a deserving plaintiff recovers damages" (footnotes omitted)).
310
See supra note 100.
311 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392 (1971) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
312
See supra Part I.B.
313
Rosen, supra note 92, at 360.
314
Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam).
315
Paul R. Owen, Reticent Revolution: Prospectsfor Damage Suits Under the New Mexico Bill
of Rights, 25 N.M. L. REV. 173, 189 (1995).
316
See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
317
Elizabeth A. Wells, Note, Injunctive Relief for Constitutional Violations: Does the Civil
Service Reform Act PrecludeEquitableRemedies?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2612, 2613 (1992); see also id.
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medial scheme, however, should not prevent the supremacy and enforcement of federal law through the use of prospective relief.3 18 The
Bivens doctrine precludes judicially created relief when there is a statutory remedial scheme available, because that doctrine's goal is to compensate the injured. 319 On the other hand, under the Ex parte
Young doctrine, compensation is not a concern-only the sovereignty
of the state is a consideration. Therefore, the existence of a remedial
scheme does not necessarily further the doctrine's purpose to help
the federal government to prevent the continued violation of its
laws.3 20 Aside from statutory remedies that provide prospective relief,3 21 the existence of a remedial scheme does not comport with the

Ex parte Young doctrine's purpose. Therefore, prospective relief must
be available without Seminoles alternative remedy limitation.
The Schweiker Court focused on the special factors limitation of
the Bivens doctrine, and held that if the issue underlying the Bivens action was a matter within Congress's purview-regardless of whether
3 22
Congress created a specific remedy-a Bivens action would not lie.

The Schweiker Court stated that a Bivens action is unavailable if there is
3 23 If
any hint that "congressional inaction has not been inadvertent."
the Court makes the congressional inaction determination on any and
all federal statutes providing remedies, many rights now enforceable
3 24
under Young could be in jeopardy.
Bivens actions are specifically created to compensate individuals
who suffered injuries at the hands of federal officials. The Bivens rationale would apply in Seminole if the Seminole Tribe sought monetary
damages or retroactive relief. However, the Tribe sought an injunction. The Ex parte Young doctrine does not deal with compensation; it
only seeks to enforce the supremacy of federal law over state officials.
In a Young situation, Edelman's prospective-retroactive distinction
at 2643-44 (observing that Schweiker and Bush disagree on whether the judiciary is permitted to award injunctive relief in Bivens actions).
318 Id. at 2644 ("The importance of traditional equitable principles to the protection
of constitutional guarantees militates against preclusion.").
319 See supra notes 98-100, 309 and accompanying text.
320 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
321 Justice Souter alluded to the concurrent operation of certain restrictions that statutory remedies and the Exparte Youngdoctrine impose. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 178-79 (Souter, J., dissenting); see supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. This
broader interpretation of the way statutory remedies affect the Ex parte Young doctrine
allows the doctrine to continue protecting federal rights. Under this interpretation, the
doctrine limits the judicially awarded remedies so that they will not stray outside of the
scope of remedies that Congress explicitly intended in a statute's remedial scheme. For
example, in Seminoe, this approach would have allowed the Tribe to use Young only to
force the state to adhere to the negotiating procedure that IGRA dictated.
322
See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
323
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988).
324
See, e.g., supranotes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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would prohibit any claim for retroactive relief. The rationale behind
the Bivens approach does not comport with the Ex parte Young doctrine, and the comprehensive remedy inquiry that Seminole created by
relying on Schweiker and Bivens is unjustified.
C.

The Balancing Test of Coeur d'Alene Further Endangers the Ex
parte Young Doctrine

The principal opinion in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe veers from
established Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence by relying on the
Seminole decision and by articulating a balancing approach to decide
the Youngjurisdictional question. 3 25 The principal opinion based its
use of a "case-by-case [balancing] approach" on Seminole's import of
the Bivens doctrine.3 26 Seminole laid the groundwork for a balancing
test by forcing the Young inquiry to consider special factors counselling hesitation. 327 Such an inquiry unwisely permits a court to look
beyond whether the aggrieved party seeks prospective relief and to
investigate broadly the various circumstances of the case. Coeur
d'Alene's reliance on the Bivens line of cases further leads the Court
astray from the correct inquiry that Edelman laid down.
The Coeur dAlene balancing test does not represent the approach
that a majority of the Justices adopted. 328 Unfortunately, however, the
concurring Justices abandoned the long established strictures of the
Ex parte Young doctrine to disallow the Tribe's suit.3 29 Justice

O'Connor's concurrence leaves open the possibility of future consideration of the principal opinion's approach, stating that "[t]he parties
have not briefed whether... [a new approach to] the Young doctrine
is warranted." 33 0 This provides the currently unpersuaded Justices
with an opportunity to legitimize the principal opinion's approach the
next time a suit against a state official arises. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the balancing approach may become the Court's
331
accepted approach when it next decides a similar case.
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2038-40 (1997).
IM at 2039 ("Seminole Tribes implicit analogy of Young to Bivens is instructive.").
327
See id (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).
325

326

328 Only two Justices joined in Coeur d'Alene's principal opinion announcing the balancing approach. Id. at 2031. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas concurred that this
test was unnecessary and in conflict with established doctrine. Id. at 2046-47 (O'Connor,
J., concurring); see supra Part II.B.2. But see infra Part III.C for the suggestion that the
concurring Justices indirectly adopted the balancing test.
329
Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
330
Id. at 2045.
331
The Court has drastically altered the Ex parte Young doctrine in two cases in two
terms, and this trend may continue when the Court has another opportunity to speak to
the issue.
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The adoption of a balancing approach will emasculate the ability
of private citizens to hold state officials responsible for their actions
and will erode the rightful supremacy of federal law. States need only
allege a credible interest in their policies in order to thwart the applicability of Young under a balancing test. 332 As a result, a state legislature may enact laws that, while not blatantly unconstitutional, will
allow the state to allege an interest sufficient to override the federal
interest. If cause for concern did not exist after Seminole, it surely
should exist now that several of the Justices in Coeur d'Alene have indicated a willingness to eliminate Edelman's bright-line test.
The balancing approach of Coeur d'Alene stands in stark contrast
to the settled approach of Edelman, and more importantly, to the underlying principles of Young. Even more so than the Seminole approach, the balancing approach threatens the supremacy of federal
law.3 33 Coeurd'Alene permits the existence of a state procedure or policy to block the assertion of a valid federal right.33 4 At least in Seminole, a federal statutory remedy precluded suit33 5 and an attempt to
resort to congressional intent existed. Coeur d'Alenes expansive balancing approach allows a state to subordinate a congressionally created federal right, regardless of the explicit or implicit intention of
Congress. This approach represents an unnecessary and improper abdication of federal power by the Court.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence claims to diverge from the principal decision's balancing approach. 33 6 However, the two rationales
O'Connor provides for disallowing the suit and for distinguishing
337
Coeur d'Alene from Young necessarily entail a balancing of interests.
The principal and concurring opinions' determination that the Tribe
may not bring a suit, because it would impinge on the State's power, is
332 See Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Brown, 124 F.Sd 1179, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1997)
(inquiring whether the plaintiff sought relief "which could arguably be held to implicate
'state policies or procedures'" (citing Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2034)).
333 See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("[T]he availability of prospective
relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause.").
334 Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2034.
335 See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
336 Coeur d'A/ene; 117 S. Ct. at 2045 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
337 The concurrence identified the following two differences between Coeur d'A/ene
and Young

First... the suit is the functional equivalent of an action to quiet [the
Tribe's] title to the bed of Lake Coeur d'Alene .... Second, the Tribe does
not merely seek to possess land that would otherwise remain subject to state
regulation, or to bring the State's regulatory scheme into compliance with
federal law. Rather, the Tribe seeks to eliminate altogether the State's regulatory power over the submerged lands at issue-to establish not only that
the State has no right to possess the property, but also that the property is
not within Idaho's sovereign jurisdiction at all.
Id. at 2043-44.

1110

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1068

effectively a balancing of federal and state interests.33 8 This determination entails considerations that exceed the Court's previously resolved federalism concerns in Edelman.3 3 9 If a court asks whether a

federal court's ruling in a Young case alters a state's power, it is, in
actuality, balancing state power against federal power. O'Connor may
refuse to call it "a case-specific analysis,"3 40 but, functionally, that is
exactly what the concurrence represents. The balancing approach
may undoubtedly soon command a majority of the Court. If that happens, the Court will further ensure Young's dissolution.
D.

Salvaging the Ex parte Young Doctrine

The Court is unlikely to adopt a revisionist approach in the near
future. 34 1 The Court will undoubtedly continue whittling away at the
Ex parte Young doctrine and fostering state sovereignty at the expense
of individual federal rights. 34 2 However, there are steps that the Court

can take to rectify the misdirection of the current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. In light of the Court's recent decisions, several
interpretations of the Ex parte Young doctrine are available that may
preserve its sanctity.
This Note examines three approaches for implementing the
Court's recent decisions limiting Young suits and discusses each interpretation's merits. First, the Court could apply the Exparte Young doctrine to federal constitutional violations, and not to violations of
federal statutory law. Second, the Court may limit the holdings of
Seminole and Coeur d'Alene to their facts. Finally, if Coeur d'Alene is not
confined to its facts for purposes of precedential value, the Court
should rely on older Ex parte Young doctrine cases for guidance on the
proper application of the Coeur d'Alene balancing test.
1. Distinguish Between Constitutionaland Statutory Claims
At its inception, the Ex parte Young doctrine emerged to protect
the constitutional rights of individuals against state infringement.3 43
The Court has extended the reach of the Ex parte Young doctrine by
3 44
affording protection to rights that federal statutory law guarantees.
See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 85.
Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2045.
See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
Cf. Coeur d'Aene, 117 S. Ct. at 2034 ("Application of the Young exception must reflect a proper understanding of its role in our federal system and respect for state courts
instead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious fiction.").
343
See supra text accompanying note 57.
344 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup.
Or. REv. 1, 33-34- see, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 69697 (1982); Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974);
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 698-99 (1949).
338
339
340
341
342
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One of the common features in the two recent Court decisions, however, is that neither involved a constitutional claim against a state
3 45
official.
Seminole and Coeur d'Alene may signal the judiciary's unwillingness
to continue providing federal court protection of suits not brought
under the Constitution.3 46 While the Court has not necessarily
demonstrated an intention to convey such a broad interpretation in
this context,3 47 the Court has expressed a reluctance to create private
rights of action or engage in federal common lawmaking.3 48 The
Court has reasoned both that separation of powers concerns mandate
that Congress decide when federal rights have remedies and that federalism dictates that the states should handle these issues.3 49 The
Court's reluctance to enforce private rights under federal statutes,
however, has not precluded it from recognizing that constitutional
claims should exist in some instances.35 0 Moreover, state officials in
lower courts have raised arguments for distinguishing between claims
351
grounded in the Constitution and suits based on a federal question.
Considering the Court's current deference to the states, this further
extension of state sovereignty may be close at hand.
See supra text accompanying notes 134-35, 202.
See, e.g., Flora, supra note 9, at 963 (arguing that in the wake of Seminole the
Supreme Court should "limit the doctrine of Ex parte Young to constitutional violations").
347 Strict adherence to the language of the Court's opinions weighs against this interpretation. The Seminole Court found solace when denying that the Commerce Clause provides a source of congressional abrogation because "an individual can bring suit against a
state officer in order to ensure that the officer's conduct is in compliance with federal law."
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) (citing ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123
(1908)). However, one must remember that the Seminole Court swiftly denied this avenue
of relief by finding that the Ex parte Young doctrine was inapplicable to the Tribe's situation. Id. at 73-76.
348
See CHEMERrNSxy, supra note 51, § 6.3.3.
345
346

349

See id

350 The Bivens doctrine is the quintessential private right that the Supreme Court
granted for constitutional violations that federal officials perpetrated. See supra Part I.B.
However, the Court has also begun infringing on the applicability of this private right. See
supra Part I.B.
351 See, e.g., Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Brown, 124 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 1997)
("Brown argues.., that Sofamor's claim must fail because Ex parte Young applies only to
federal constitutional violations, not to violations of federal statutory law."); Armstrong v.
Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1026-32 (9th Cir. 1997); Hale v. Belshe, No. 97-15177, 1997 WL
377113, at *2 (9th Cir. July 3, 1997) ("[Tlhe state officials maintain that the Young exception is limited to constitutional violations and does not extend to permit suits against state
officials that turn on statutory claims."); cf Jackson, supra note 33, at 529.
While it can be persuasively argued that courts have a greater role to play in
assuring available remedies for vindication of constitutional rights than
with respect to statutory rights, this argument is usually made against a
backdrop in which Congress has provided some remedy for a statutory right
and a private litigant seeks something beyond what Congress has provided.
IM.(footnote omitted).
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Ironically, many revisionists would also support the elimination of
federal question cases from the Ex parte Young doctrine's purview.
However, the grounds for the revisionist position are significantly different from those of the Court's federalist majority. Revisionists argue
not only that Young need not recognize federal question claims, but
that the proper interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment should
not contemplate the inclusion of federal question cases in its prohibition of suits against states.3 5 2 Despite the approach that the revisionists envision, a limitation on the Ex parte Young doctrine by the current
Court allowing only constitutional claims would not similarly save federal question cases from the Eleventh Amendment.
An interpretation of these cases that only enables a party to use
the Ex parte Young doctrine when it grounds its claim in a constitutional right severely undermines the significant service that the Ex
parte Young doctrine provides. Courts, individuals, and even Congress
itself, have come to rely on the ability of the federal courts to protect
federal rights. This expansive interpretation of Seminole and Coeur
d'Alene leaves individuals without the ability to enter federal courts to
seek the protection of many statutory rights and leaves federal courts
without the power to ensure the supremacy of federal law.
2.

Limit the Court's Holdings to Their Facts

The Court's decisions in Seminole and Coeur d'Alene may foreshadow a narrowing of the Ex parte Young doctrine on one of two factual levels. One approach may be to limit these decisions to their
respective contexts. Another interpretation is to apply the additional
limitations of Seminole and Coeur d'Alene to all suits that Tribes bring.
The Seminole opinion arguably provides a general rule that courts
will not grant Youngjurisdiction in all similar suits if a comprehensive
remedial scheme exists.35 3 However, a qualifying footnote accompanies this language. One can read footnote seventeen to limit the Seminole holding because it states: "[The Court] find[s] only that Congress
did not intend [to grant jurisdiction under Ex parte Young] in the In354
dian Gaming Regulatory Act."
Moreover, the Court focuses on the language of the statute and
on whether it is directed at a "state" or a "state official."3 55 The Court
found this distinction significant because it indicated that Congress's
intent in IGRA was not to permit suits against state officials. 3 56 How352
See Althouse, supra note 271, at 973 ("[A]s a minority of the Court has argued,
along with numerous commentators, the Eleventh Amendment could be interpreted not
to refer to federal question cases."); supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
353
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74-75 (1996).
354
Id. at 75 n.17.
355
Id.
356 Id. at 75-76.
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ever, such a distinction is unprecedented. 357 The only authority that
the Court relies upon to support this theory is State ex rel Stephan v.
Finney.358 Finney, which arose in the Kansas Supreme Court, only addressed whether Kansas's governor had the ability to bind the State in
a contract entered into with an Indian Tribe under IGRA.3 59 This
court did not inquire into statutory construction or interpretation,
and it only analyzed the policy of the State of Kansas with regard to
actions of its officials. Thus, the Supreme Court's Seminole and Coeur
d'Alene holdings rely on a state court decision that is tenuously related-at best-to evidence Congress's intent not to allow a suit under
Young. The Court's questionable use of this case and its inability to
identify additional authority are further support that the holding of
Seminole is applicable only to suits brought under IGRA.
Similarly, the Coeurd'Alene Court held that Youngwas inapplicable
in a suit that addressed a state's ability to regulate its navigable waters
with respect to submerged lands lying under a lake.3 60 The Coeur

dAlene Court dealt with a unique situation because the issue before
the Court arose in a suit between two sovereigns, and could only arise
in suits between sovereigns in the future. 3 61 The context of this situation permits the conclusion that the Coeur d'Alene Court did not intend to alter Youngjurisprudence in any significant way.3 62 Moreover,

because the balancing approach that the principal opinion introduced does not command a majority, this case arguably imposes no
new limitation on the Ex parte Young doctrine outside of suits between
363
sovereigns.
While the Court extended its evisceration of Young beyond the
confines of IGRA in Coeur d'Alene, the Court still focused its energies
on prohibiting a Tribe from bringing suit. The Court may have intended a narrow construction of Seminole and Coeur d'Alene that would
apply only in actions that Tribes brought, but several lower court decisions have already extended the balancing inquiry into non-Tribal
357

See id. at 169-82 (Souter, J., dissenting).

358

836 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992).

359
360

I& at 1170.

Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2040-43 (1997); id. at 2044
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[The Court has] repeatedly emphasized the importance of
submerged lands to state sovereignty. Control of such lands is critical to a State's ability to
regulate use of its navigable waters."); supra Part II.B.1-2.
361 Coeur dAene 117 S. Ct. at 2042 (noting that American law in this area is based on
"the perceived public character of submerged lands, a perception which underlies and
informs the principle that these lands are tied in a unique way to sovereignty").
362
See Leading Case, Ex parte Young Doctrine 111 HARv. L. REv. 269, 278 (1997) (concluding that the Court "carved a new and very narrow exception to Young for submerged
lands").
363
Suits between sovereigns include only those suits that arise between: (1) a state and
another state, (2) the United States government and a state, or (3) an Indian tribe and a
state.
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matters. 3 64 However, a majority of courts have yet to apply this new
approach, so the more limited interpretation-that these cases apply
only to suits either under IGRA or regarding submerged lands-may
be a plausible reading of the law.
Ultimately, the Court's approach in Seminole and Coeur dAlene
may simply be a signal that the ever-changing federal policy with respect to Indian Tribes is still evolving.3 65 The language of the Seminole opinion and the coincidental facts of these two cases may support
such an interpretation. However, it is both unlikely and unreasonable
to conclude that the Court's sole intention in Seminole and Coeur
dAlene was to prohibit generally a Tribe's use of the Ex parte Young
3 66
doctrine.
3.

Clarify the Weight Given to the Interests Considered Under the
Coeur d'Alene Balancing Test

Assuming that the balancing test that the principal opinion used
in Coeur d'Alene becomes the standard approach for determining the
applicability of the Exparte Young doctrine, 6 7 another means by which
to protect the doctrine from continued curtailment is to accord
greater weight to federal interests over competing state interests. The
principal opinion has left room for further refinement of the weight
given to each of the factors considered in its balancing test. Moreover, this new inquiry will undoubtedly require courts to determine
whether the federal or state interests should prevail when both are
arguably equal once balanced. This determination would effectively
364 The Ninth Circuit has already extended Coeur dAene to a situation not involving an
Indian Tribe. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Brown, 124 F.3d 1179, 1183-85 (9th Cir.
1997) (using principles that Coeur d'Alene set forth in a suit that a corporation brought
against a state official). But see Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124
F.3d 904, 912-14 (8th Cir. 1997) (declining to extend Coeur dAlene in a suit that a tribe
brought).
365 See Eric Henderson, Indian Gaming: Social Consequences, 29 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 205, 248
(1997) ("Federal [Indian] policy has not been consistent over time.").
366 Assuming the worst, tribes would still have two mechanisms available to assert their
rights against states or state officials: (1) suits in state courts and (2) suits in federal courts
that the United States brings in its trust capacity. However, each of these means is inade-

quate. State governments and tribes are too often embroiled in competing interests for
state courts to provide the necessary protection. See Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin, Case
Comment, The Eleventh Amendment and Seminole Tribe: Reinvigorating the Doctrine of State
Sovereign Immunity, 73 N.D. L. REv. 517, 54142 (1997). Suits that the United States government brings on behalf of tribes also provide insufficient recourse. SeeJackson, supranote
33, at 540-41 (arguing that the federal government "cannot always be relied on to protect
the federal rights of all its people").
367 See supra Part III.C. Several courts have mistakenly adopted the principal opinion's
balancing test as the proper approach. See Brown, 124 F.3d at 1184; Kish v. Michigan State
Bd. of Exam'rs, No. 97-CV-71342-DT, 1998 WL 155692, at *4-*5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31,
1998).
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present the same question that the Edelman Court answered by articulating a straightforward test.3 68

Courts can remedy the vague and uncertain approach that a minority of the Court adopted in Coeur d'Alene by applying principles
that earlier Youngjurisprudence has articulated. Courts should continue to consider factors such as whether the State is the real party in
interest, 36 9 the nature of the relief requested,3 7 0 and whether the
supreme authority of federal law is implicated. 37 1 Courts will need
guidance to administer the balancing test, and reliance on prior precedent will provide the necessary instruction to protect both an individual's federal rights and the vitality of the Ex parte Young doctrine.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court improperly limited the doctrine of Ex parte
Youngwith its decisions in Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene. The Court
failed to recognize the distinct and important purposes that the Ex
parte Young doctrine fulfills by upholding the supremacy of federal
rights, and the Court mistakenly relied on precedent that is inapplicable to the framework of the doctrine.
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has evolved in an effort to
address the varying interests of individuals, states, and the federal government. The Ex parte Young doctrine arose out of a need to protect
federal rights, a need which emanated from the Court's erroneous
decision in Hans v. Louisiana. Until the Court overrules or substantively deals with Hans, the preservation of the Ex parte Young doctrine
is necessary to assure that the states do not override the interests of
the federal government and individuals.
Unfortunately, the Court has not taken into consideration all of
the various interests in its recent decisions. Prior to the Seminole decision, Edelman v. Jordan provided a balanced approach to the Ex parte
Young doctrine that addressed each of the three interests. The Court
upset that balance with its reliance on the single, arguably unrelated
Schweiker v. Chilicky decision. The imprudence of the Seminole and
Coeur d'Alene decisions has the potential to erode the doctrine of Ex
parte Young and to render impotent many federal rights that individuals now enjoy.

368

369
370

371

See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 44-47, 77-81.
See supra text accompanying notes 74-77, 82.
See Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); supra Part III.L.

